Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other  Survivalists by Hirsch, Jeffrey M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 67 Issue 3 Article 2 
1998 
Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and 
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response 
to Henry Hansmann and Other "Survivalists" 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other "Survivalists", 67 Fordham L. Rev. 957 
(1998). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and Implementation of 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other 
"Survivalists" 
Cover Page Footnote 
Law clerk to Chief Judge H. Robert Mayer, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. B.A., 
1992, University of Virginia; M.P.P., 1995, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1998, New York University. 
Special thanks is owed to Professor Samuel Estreicher, who both provided the idea for this Article and 
gave enormous assistance throughout its development. I would also like to thank Professor Lewis 
Kornhauser, Professor William Nelson, and Paul Schmidt for their helpful comments. All errors are, of 
course, my own. An earlier and shorter version of this Article will appear in Proceedings of N.Y.U. 50th 
Annual Conference on Labor (Samuel Estreicher ed., forthcoming 1998). 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol67/iss3/2 
ARTICLES
LABOR LAW OBSTACLES TO THE
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLANS: A RESPONSE TO HENRY
HANSMANN AND OTHER "SURVIVALISTS"
Jeffrey M. Hirsch*
INTRODUCTION
P OLICY debate in the United States over how best to promote
employee productivity increasingly emphasizes the importance of
employee ownership of firms. Employee ownership plans, which can
vary from those that merely serve as a form of pension to those
through which employees undertake a complete buy-out of a firm,
have increased in large part as a result of the tax breaks given to these
plans. As American business has begun to follow economies such as
Japan's, in which companies seek to capture some of their employees'
information about the production process, viewing this input as part of
a superior organizational form, employee ownership has taken a more
prominent role in the American workplace.
On a theoretical level, employee ownership may result in significant
advantages for firm performance over conventional investor owner-
ship. Evidence reveals, however, fewer employee-ovned firms than
such theories would suggest, resulting from either overly optimistic or
misguided theories or from other factors that may limit the number of
employee-owned firms. The "survivalist" critique, as argued most no-
tably by Professor Henry Hansmann, suggests that this paucity of em-
ployee-owned firms is evidence of their inefficiency relative to
investor-owned firms.' This Article contends that labor law may be a
limiting factor that creates obstacles to the implementation of em-
ployee ownership and control; therefore, labor law may be a reason
* Law clerk to Chief Judge H. Robert Mayer, United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. B.A., 1992, University of Virginia; M.P.P., 1995, College of
William & Mary; J.D., 1998, New York University. Special thanks is owed to Profes-
sor Samuel Estreicher, who both provided the idea for this Article and gave enor-
mous assistance throughout its development. I would also like to thank Professor
Lewis Kornhauser, Professor William Nelson, and Paul Schmidt for their helpful com-
ments. All errors are, of course, my own. An earlier and shorter version of this Arti-
cle will appear in Proceedings of N.Y.U. 50th Annual Conference on Labor (Samuel
Estreicher ed., forthcoming 1998).
1. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs,
Law Finns, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 Yale L.I. 1749 (1990) (cit-
ing the lack of observed employee-owned companies as evidence of their economic
inefficiency).
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for the relatively low number of plans, not the inefficiencies cited by
the "survivalist" critique.
Proponents of employee ownership argue that public subsidies for
Employee Stock Ownership Plans ("ESOPs") are warranted by their
positive effect on firms' economic efficiency, yet many contend that
employee ownership is an inefficient organizational form and should
not be subsidized. What the empirical evidence seems to show, how-
ever, is that ESOPs, particularly those that have some degree of em-
ployee control, can benefit certain types of firms.'
In seeking this control, employees must often rely on unions, which
possess advantages that may make them the best employee represent-
atives to advance employee ownership.' Unions, however, have been
particularly hesitant to initiate ESOPs. While this disinclination re-
sults from many factors, such as workers' risk-aversion, unions' tradi-
tional role in labor relations, and unions' lack of employee ownership
expertise, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act")4
also erects barriers to union involvement in employee ownership. In
particular, the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or
"Board") interpretation of the Act creates obstacles to the implemen-
tation of plans that involve significant employee control.
This Article argues that the Board, through its interpretation of the
NLRA, is unjustifiably opposed to employee control and ownership of
a firm. This resistance both limits the number of beneficial plans that
can be implemented and prevents employees who participate in em-
ployee ownership plans from gaining control in exchange for incurring
increased financial risk. The Board, like many unions, holds a tradi-
tional view of the workplace, where there is a clear, and often antago-
nistic, distinction between labor and management. This view
precludes employee ownership plans, which typically blur this distinc-
tion.5 This Article asserts that the Board's adherence to a strict line
between labor and management is harmful in the employee ownership
context. Employee ownership plans provide a means through which
the interests of both labor and management may be protected, while
also allowing the increased employee input that business seeks in the
present economic environment. Board obstacles to employee owner-
ship, therefore, often prevent plans that could help a firm. Moreover,
once a plan is implemented these obstacles limit employees' ability to
bargain for control, a significant factor in the benefit workers gain
from employee ownership.
Part I of this Article discusses the basic structure and history of ES-
OPs. Part II then reviews some of the advantages and disadvantages
of employee ownership, as well as economic literature on ESOPs' ef-
2. See infra Part II.C.
3. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
5. See infra note 369 and accompanying text.
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fect on firm performance. Part III examines the labor law issues that
are implicated by employee ownership plans, particularly focusing on
plans that contain significant employee input into firm decision-mak-
ing. Finally, part IV discusses the effects of labor law obstacles on the
implementation of employee ownership, and suggests some reform
possibilities.
I. ESOP STRUCTURE
Support for worker ownership as a superior firm structure, at least
for certain types of companies, has been growing for years. Much of
this movement is centered on ESOPs, through which employees are
able to invest in their firm's equity.6 Typically, these plans create a
trust for employees that borrows money, then loans the borrowed
money to the employer while obtaining stock from the employer as
repayment for the loan. ESOPs, however, can take many forms, with
varying levels of employee control.7 Presently, there are approxi-
mately 10,000 companies that have ESOPs' and around 2,000 of these
plans hold a majority of the company's stock.9 ESOPs cover over 11.5
million employees, 10 who collectively control an estimated $150 billion
in assets." Moreover, companies in which employee ownership is
"dominant" (usually consisting of 15% or more of the firm's stock)
could make up a quarter of the companies on the New York Stock
Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and over-the-counter markets
by the year 2000.12 The majority of ESOP firms, however,-around
90%-are closely-held companies.' 3
6. This Article does not limit its analysis to ESOPs; rather, any employee owner-
ship plan, particularly one that implicates employee control over firm decision-mak-
ing, will be relevant to the discussion. The term "ESOP" will often be used, however,
and, unless stated otherwise, the discussion will apply to all similar employee owner-
ship plans.
7. See Deborah Groban Olson, Union Erperiences with Worker Ownership:
Legal and Practical Issues Raised by ESOPs, TRASOPs, Stock Purchases and Co-
operatives, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 729, 732 n.1 [hereinafter Olson, Worker Ownership].
ESOPs are defined in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7). Workers do not have full voting rights in
about 85% of ESOP companies. See John Hoerr, ESOPs: Revolution or Ripoff?, Bus.
Wk., Apr. 15, 1985, at 94, 95.
8. See Joseph Blasi et al., Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance
Among Public Companies, 50 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 60, 60 (1996); Corey Rosen, An
Introduction to ESOPs, in Selling to an ESOP 7, 7 (Scott Rodrick ed., 1996); Louis
Uchitelle, Downsizing Comes to Employee-Owned America, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1996,
§ 4, at 3.
9. See Uchitelle, supra note 8, at 3.
10. See Rosen, supra note 8, at 7.
11. See id. at 14.
12. See Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, Strategic Problems and Tactical
Promise: Unions and Employee Ownership, 42 Lab. L.J. 498, 505-06 (1991), for a
discussion of the rapid increase in employee ownership in publicly traded companies.
As of 1994, 21% of companies on the three major exchanges had an average of 15%
employee ownership. See Adam Bryant, Subtler Than a Picket Line, N.Y. Times, Apr.
17, 1994, § 3, at 7 [hereinafter Bryant, Subtler].
13. See Blasi & Kruse, supra note 12, at 500.
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The structure of ESOPs can vary significantly, but at their core they
are equity plans that hold shares of a company in a trust for their
participants. The most important variation among plans involve the
rights given to employees. Employee ownership plans typically do not
have to "pass-through" voting rights to the employee-owners, and
even with pass-through voting, a trustee may vote in place of actual
workers.14 Pay-outs for ESOPs can vary widely, with most plans hold-
ing the shares until a worker leaves15 and, most importantly, the level
of actual worker participation in managerial policy-making (e.g., in-
volvement in firm decision-making, voting rights, etc.) is never certain.
Because an ESOP can provide significant tax advantages to a com-
pany that needs increased cash flow, 16 an employer can create an
ESOP that owns a majority of the company but gives employees virtu-
ally no voice in managerial policy-making.
ESOPs are qualified under the Internal Revenue Code as a stock
bonus plan.'7 In a "leveraged" ESOP, employers, employees, unions,
management, or third-parties can set up an Employee Stock Owner-
ship Trust ("ESOT").' 8 This entity can borrow money to buy com-
pany stock or sell new shares of its own stock to buy existing shares.19
The trust holds the stock as collateral against the loan. The trustee
can come from either inside or outside the company, but has a duty to
the participants alone.2" The employer and employees then make
contributions, in varying amounts depending on the plan, to pay back
the loan. As contributions are made, the stock is gradually released
from the trust and qualified employees can receive the stock. The
ESOP allows employers to borrow money with significant tax
breaks,2 a while employees are given stakes in the firm's equity. Be-
cause a loan is made with the firm's future as collateral, the ESOP is
considered "leveraged." The ability of employers to gain tax breaks
and employees to gain equity, and the rights associated with equity,
are the major differences between ESOPs and a leveraged buy-out
("LBO"). These differences may explain some of the growing popu-
larity for ESOPs relative to LBOs, which exhibit much narrower em-
14. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(22), 409(e)(2)-(3) (1994). Pass-through voting refers to
the ability of employee-owners to vote their shares, rather than having the ESOP
trustee vote. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text for further discussion.
15. See Rosen, supra note 8, at 9-10.
16. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. As discussed below, ESOPs
without employee input or control seem to further the operational advantages of em-
ployee ownership less than plans with such control. See infra text accompanying notes
175-81. This Article, therefore, will focus on employee ownership negotiations that
involve actual worker input in firm decision-making.
17. See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7).
18. See Malon Wilkus, Employee Buyouts of Corporations, Subsidiaries, Divisions,
and Product Lines, J. Employee Ownership L. & Fin. 23, 30 (1994).
19. See Rosen, supra note 8, at 8-9.
20. See id. at 9.
21. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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ployee participation and do not receive subsidies. Non-leveraged
ESOPs generally are created either to supplement or replace pension
plans, or as an alternative means of compensation. The employer, and
sometimes employees, contribute to the non-leveraged ESOP, thereby
giving employees company stock that they can either keep or cash-out
upon leaving the company.
The precise structure of ESOPs-beyond the level of employee
control-has little direct impact on labor law's treatment of employee
ownership. Their structure, however, is critical to their treatment
under the tax code. Therefore, because the tax advantages for em-
ployee ownership plans are an inherent component of their use, the
tax implications for such plans must be understood to evaluate their
implementation under labor law.
A. Tax Implications of ESOPs
A significant advantage of employee ownership is an employer's
ability to sell shares to the trust and then make tax-deductible contri-
butions to the ESOP, enabling the trust to buy back the loan while
deducting all of the interest and deducting from the principal up to
25% of the compensation paid to employees out of the plan.2? An
ESOP also allows an employer to deduct up to 15% of the compensa-
tion given to participants under the plan.24 If the employer has a
money purchase pension plan as well, up to 25% of the contributions
is deductible.' Fimally, the maximum yearly employee contribution is
the lesser of 25% of the employee's wages or $30,000; this cap in-
cludes contributions to any other qualified benefit plan. 6
It is estimated that the use of an ESOP will create tax savings over a
typical buy-out equal to 40% of the amount contributed. 27 Also, if the
ESOP owns a majority of the company, interest payments on debt are
usually around 85% of those on a non-ESOP buy-out.'
To be eligible for participation in the ESOP the employee must be
deemed a qualified "participant," which usually requires full-time
22. See Wilkus, supra note 18, at 25 (1994). A LBO is simply a means by which a
buyer can borrow money, often using the target company's assets as collateral, in
order to purchase a firm. Leveraged ESOPs are basically the same, except they enjoy
tax benefits that LBOs do not. Leveraged ESOPs are favored by unions because they
allow the use of credit to purchase a large share of the company. See Blasi & Kruse,
supra note 12, at 502-03.
23. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(A)-(B) (1994); see also id. § 1032 (stating that no gain
or loss will be recognized by a corporation's sale of stock).
24. See id. § 404(a)(3)(A)(i).
25. See id- § 404(a)(7).
26. See id- § 415(c)(1).
27. See Wilkus, supra note 18, at 46 (describing the savings that result from the
ability to deduct contributions to ESOPs).
28. See id- (describing the savings that occur because, in such cases, 50% of the
interest income is deductible).
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work at the firm for at least one year.2 9 The stock must fully vest in
five years, or start vesting 20% per year after three years (fully vesting
after eight years).3 0 Participants do not have to pay taxes on divi-
dends as long as they still own equity in the trust.3 Moreover, em-
ployees usually only are able to sell their shares upon leaving the
company. The level of ownership that employees can receive varies
from minimal to total ownership,32 but typical ESOPs involve around
30% to 40% employee ownership of the firm; approximately a third of
companies with employee ownership are majority-owned. 33 It is esti-
mated that ESOPs provide an average benefit to employees "equal to
1.5 times [their] annual pay over 10 years and 4 times [their] annual
pay after 20 years." 3
4
B. The Role of Employees in ESOPs
One difficulty in setting up ESOPs is the inclusion of employee con-
trol in the management of the firm. Gaining employee control
through an ESOP is usually necessary to realize many benefits of the
employee-ownership.35 Generally, however, firms are reluctant to
give employees increased power.36 In private companies, employees
must be given pass-through voting rights. At a minimum, this would
allow for a trustee, who owes a fiduciary duty to the employee-own-
ers, to vote on major decisions such as closings or relocation.37 In
public companies, employees must be given the same voting stock as
required for all public firms, which provide greater voting rights than
stock in private companies.38
The level of actual control given to employees, however, can vary
widely depending on the structure of the ESOP. 39 Because voting
rights can be assigned to a trustee, an individual employee-owner may
only possess financial distribution rights in her company, without ob-
taining any voting rights. Once the shares are distributed (as the loan
29. See I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A)(ii).
30. See id. § 411(a)(2)(A)-(B).
31. See id. § 404(k)(1).
32. See Rosen, supra note 8, at 8.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 14 (describing the results of a National Center for Employee Ownership
("NCEO") study that measured total benefits from the ESOP to the participant, in-
cluding dividends and stock value, against wages).
35. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing the divergence of inter-
ests between shareholders and managers that may lead management to protect their
own salary, job security, or decision-making power over potentially contradictory in-
terests of the firm).
37. See I.R.C. §8 401(a)(22), 409(e)(2) (1994).
38. Compare I.R.C. § 409(e)(2) (discussing a registration-type class of securities),
with I.R.C. § 409(e)(3) (discussing requirements of other employers).
39. See, e.g., Bruce V. Bigelow, Shipyard Merger Has Run Aground, San Diego
Union-Trib., Aug. 7, 1996, at C-1 (reporting an example of an ESOP that gives indi-
vidual employees little control in their company).
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is paid off), the employee-owner is able to vote those shares; it takes
many years, however, for such a distribution to occur. Thus, em-
ployee-owners are left facing the risks associated with equity without
any voting rights in their stock.
The tax incentives given to ESOPs illustrate the public policy favor-
itism that they have enjoyed. The "father" of ESOPs, Louis Kelso,
managed to convince Senator Russell Long that employee ownership
would enable wealth to be spread to workers, thereby improving the
economy." ESOPs were initially introduced in 1974 as part of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").41 Their use
began to grow in the 1970s, not because of the economy-stimulating
benefits posited by Kelso and Long, but rather, as a defense mecha-
nism against hostile takeovers. 42 A Supreme Court decision prevent-
ing states from passing anti-takeover legislation,43 as well as a 1989
Delaware Court of Chancery ruling that upheld the use of a defensive
ESOP,44 caused their use to grow dramatically.45 In particular, ES-
OPs began to be used as a capital raising mechanism, in large part as a
result of their tax incentives.46 In the 1980s, ESOPs also were being
used as a weapon by hostile raiders attempting to acquire compa-
nies.47 In the late 1980s, firms began to realize the value of ESOPs as
a means of funding pensions and retirement benefits.4" While the use
of ESOPs as either a takeover defense or a means to save a troubled
company has been well publicized, The National Center for Employee
Ownership ("NCEO") estimates that less than 4% of ESOPs are es-
tablished for these purposes.4 9
40. See Elana Ruth Hollo, Note, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans and Their Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions, and Future
American Policy, 23 Rutgers LJ. 561, 563-64 (1992) (discussing Kelso's impact on the
use of ESOPs); see also 93 Cong. Rec. S40,753 (daily ed. D=c. 11, 1973) (statement of
Sen. Long) ("I am convinced we cannot retain our economic greatness if we do not
... make it possible within a few years, for every household and individual in America
to become an owner of a viable holding of productive capital.").
41. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1221-32 (1994).
42. See Hollo, supra note 40, at 572.
43. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982) (holding that an Illinois law
creating disclosure requirements for takeovers, and preventing the bidder from solic-
iting support while the target company is free to do so, violated the Commerce
Clause).
44. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 274 (Del. Ch.
1989) (holding that the use of an ESOP as an antitakeover defense did not violate
director's fiduciary duty).
45. See Hollo, supra note 40, at 573-74.
46. See id at 574.
47. See id (describing raiders' attempts to gain employee-owner votes through
proxy battles and tender offers).
48. See id at 575 & n.57 (discussing the integration of ESOPs and 401(k) plans).
49. See Rosen, supra note 8, at 8 (citing NCEO estimates). In addition to their use
as a benefit plan or takeover tool, 3% of ESOPs involve employee concessions, and
8% replace pension plans. See id. Other estimates have been even lower, including
1% used in takeovers. See Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 65. Another estimate is 2.5%
involving benefit concessions from either wages or pensions. See Douglas L Kruse,
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Employees, as well, have begun to view employee ownership more
favorably, often as a tool to obtain increased participation." This par-
ticipation can provide employees with gains in working conditions, as
well as the chance to increase their share of a firm's future profits.5
Yet, employers are often reluctant to weaken their own managerial
power in order to give employees increased rights.52 As this Article
will discuss, labor law not only encourages this reluctance, but also
places additional barriers to employee and union attempts to increase
participation through employee ownership.
Unions traditionally have been reluctant to initiate employee own-
ership plans. There are several reasons for this. First, the creation
and management of ESOPs takes a great deal of specialized knowl-
edge, which most unions do not possess. The large informational
start-up costs can be a significant barrier to unions, and especially in-
dividual employees, seeking to initiate an ESOP.53 Only in industries
where employee ownership emerged as a response to financial
problems such as the steel and plywood industries have unions been
willing to investigate ESOP opportunities.
Second, ESOPs decrease employees' financial diversification. As
discussed below, 54 employees, who generally have few if any signifi-
cant assets, face a significant financial risk when their wages, future
benefits, and savings are tied to a single corporation.55 For example,
ESOPs may be used to replace pension plans rather than to supple-
ment them, thereby concentrating employees' present and future ben-
efits in one firm.56 Unions are, therefore, justifiably reluctant to
expose their members to the degree of financial risk associated with
employee ownership.
Unions also typically prefer to equalize employee compensation
within an industry. 7 A successful ESOP can create significant dispari-
ties among firms represented by a single union, thereby hurting a
Pension Substitution in the 1980s: Why the Shift Toward Defined Contribution?, 34
Indus. Rel. 218 (1995). It does appear, however, that unions are typically involved in
ESOPs associated with troubled firms, perhaps accounting for the greater publicity
for this type of plan. See Blasi & Kruse, supra note 12, at 504-05.
50. See Bryant, Subtler, supra note 12 (citing the Teamsters and other unions' in-
creased use of shareholder suits on behalf of employees); Diane E. Lewis, Unions
Seeking Leverage as Shareholders, Boston Globe, Apr. 7, 1996, at 71 (citing unions'
increased willingness to use ESOPs to address workplace issues).
51. See infra Part II.
52. See infra note 186.
53. See Toni Delmonte, In Defense of Union Involvement in Worker Ownership, 10
In Pub. Interest 14, 18 (1990).
54. See infra Part II.B.1.
55. See Wilkus, supra note 18, at 33-35.
56. See Hollo, supra note 40, at 590. ESOPs are exempted from ERISA diversifi-
cation requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b) (1994).
57. See Hollo, supra note 40, at 589-90.
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union's attempt to set industry-wide wages.5 Labor leaders, more-
over, like employers and the Board, are firm believers in the tradi-
tional dichotomy between management and labor.59 Union leaders
also may fear the creation of a conflict of interest between the em-
ployee-owners' interest as workers and their interest in the overall
well-being of the firm. 60 Finally, there is the question of a union's
ability to represent the employee-owners' interests both as employees
and as owners-for example, a union may favor fixed short-term ben-
efits over long-term profitability. This concern may be mitigated,
however, by the structure of most ESOP firms, through which the em-
ployee-owners' labor interests will be represented by union board
members, while their equity interests are directly protected by the
ESOT trustee and indirectly protected by non-union directors.
Despite unions' past reluctance to initiate employee ownership
plans with significant employee control,6' labor organizations seem to
be much better suited for the task than individual employees, and
could be a strong force in the growth of employee ownership plans
involving employee control. 62 Unions possess the resources and orga-
nizational strength to protect workers' interests in forming ESOPs.6
Of these interests, the desire for actual employee control in employee-
owned firms will be central to unions' role in forming employee own-
ership plans.' Because unions' primary role has been to guarantee
the security and economic welfare of workers, an increased role in
promulgating employee ownership fits organized labor's desire to in-
crease worker influence.65
58. See Bruce E. Kaufman & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Monopoly, Efficient Con-
trac4 and Median Voter Models of Union Wage Determination: A Critical Compari-
son, 11 J. Lab. Res. 401, 410-14 (1990); Hollo, supra note 40, at 590.
59. See Hollo, supra note 40, at 590-91; see also Delmonte, supra note 53, at 15-16
(detailing labor's traditional view of worker ownership).
60. See Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee Su-
pervision of Management, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1988) [hereinafter Harper, Recon-
ciling Collective Bargaining].
61. This reluctance is indicated by data that shows an underrepresentation of un-
ions participating in ESOPs. See Blasi & Kruse, supra note 12, at 502-05 (finding that
unions, despite representing 12.2% of the workforce at the time, only participated in
7.02% of leveraged employee buyouts, and those plans that they were involved in
tended to be for troubled, and typically smaller, companies or as concessions in
bargaining).
62. See Russell M. Yankwitt, Note, Buy Me Some Peanuts and Ownership: Major
League Baseball and the Need for Employee Ownership, 5 Cornell J.L & Pub. Pol'y
401, 411 (1996) (stating that unions can provide the "information, education, experi-
ence, and collective force" that employees lack in influencing an ESOP formation).
63. See Delmonte, supra note 53, at 18.
64. See id. at 19; see also Leis, supra note 50, at 71 (detailing the rise in union
shareholder activism).
65. See Deborah Groban Olson, Giving Employee Owners a Real Voice as Stock-
holders, 6 J. Employee Ownership L. & Fin. 109, 116-17 (1994) [hereinafter Olson,
Real Voice]; see also Bryant, Subtler, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing the -growing
number of union-related efforts to lobby for change with proxies instead of pickets").
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The union's involvement does not stop once an ESOP is promul-
gated. Unions also can play an important role in monitoring the com-
pany's operation and representing workers' interests, within the limits
of the law, in certain firm decisions.66 While organizations specializing
in ESOP formation, such as American Capital Strategies, can be used
by employees during this process, unions have more experience repre-
senting employee interests in negotiations with employers, albeit not
necessarily in their capacity as employee-owners. As unions become
more experienced with employee ownership plans, their involvement
in initiating and renegotiating these plans, as well as representing em-
ployee-owners on the company's board of directors, may become
more important. Indeed, the repeated dealings with a company may
allow a union to represent employee-owners in much the same way as
they represent bargaining unit workers now; unions, therefore, can
have an important role in protecting employee-owners' interest in an
ongoing organization that is at least partially employee-owned.
Although unions may at present play a limited role in employee
ownership plans, they are vital to the careful creation of ESOPs that
provide actual employee participation and respect for employee inter-
ests. 67 Some sources of unions' limited influence appear self-imposed.
Labor law, however, also may create barriers to union participation in
ESOPs. In order for unions to assume a prominent role in ESOP im-
plementation, these barriers must be addressed. The potential advan-
tages and disadvantages of employee ownership also play a key role in
determining whether, or where, to implement an ESOP. One must
understand the potential risks and benefits of employee ownership
plans in order to evaluate their present regulation.
66. The ESOP trustee does not fill this function. The trustee may not even be
selected until after the ESOP is implemented, thereby precluding employee protec-
tion during the formation of the ESOP. Also, the trustee's duty is to the financial
status of the fund, which protects the employee-owners' equity interests, but not their
interests as employees. There is a possible conflict of interest if the trustee is affiliated
with the same union representing the employee-owners' labor interests. The trustee,
however, has a fiduciary duty to the employee-owners' equity interests alone,
although this duty does not, of course, eliminate the conflict.
67. See Blasi & Kruse, supra note 12, at 505; see also Don Driver, Kelly Union
Eyes Stock Ownership-Group Officials Looking into Proposals with Contractors,
San Antonio Express-News, Sept. 21, 1995 (describing union activity in initiating an
ESOP with employee control), available in 1995 WL 9502940; Lewis, supra note 50
(noting labor unions' growing stress on gaining power through shareholder activism,
including use of the AFL-CIO's data set, which monitors performance of corporate
boards). Unions also can be a source of information for workers who are unaware of
the possible benefits of gaining greater managerial control.
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II. PROS AND CONS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
The literature on employee ownership cites significant differences in
terms of its impact on business.6" Perhaps, as a result of the difficulty
in isolating the effect of employee ownership on firm performance,
commentators such as Hansmann have cited the paucity of ESOPs as
evidence of their inefficiency as a corporate structure-this is the
"survivalist" critique.69 This Article disagrees with those commenta-
tors, arguing that labor law obstacles to employee ownership are par-
tially responsible for the relative lack of ESOPs observed.'"
A. Advantages of ESOPs
Demonstrating that employee ownership can have beneficial effects
on firm performance justifies removal of some of the Board's obsta-
cles to ESOP creation. The following is a presentation of the effects
that employee ownership may have on a firm's performance. Eco-
nomic research on the efficacy of employee ownership shows that ES-
OPs can benefit certain companies and should not be stifled by the
Board. If the Board is to achieve its goals of promoting industrial
peace and addressing inequitable bargaining power in the workplace,
it should not obstruct employee ownership plans that may help the
firm while enhancing employee voice.
1. Reduction of Information Asymmetries
Under the traditional workplace model, both employers and em-
ployees have a clear incentive to withhold certain types of information
from one another. Management has informational advantages regard-
ing a firm's financial status and future plans, such as plant closings or
relocations, which can directly affect workers." Conversely, employ-
ees know more than employers about their own preferences and effort
levels, production changes that may improve productivity, and the
performance of managers.' As a result of what Professor Alan Hyde
calls "low trust of management among employees," workers will with-
68. While this Article will not attempt an independent contribution to the litera-
ture on ESOPs' influence on firm performance, it is important to understand the pos-
sible effects of this type of organizational structure.
69. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1797-1800, 1811-12.
70. See infra Part IH.
71. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1765; Michael L Wachter & George M. Co-
hen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Applica-
tion to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. Pa. L
Rev. 1349, 1359 (1988); see also Robert Schwab, Mobile Tool Alarks a Year of Success:
Employee Buyout Saved Company Jobs, Deny. Post, May 11, 1996, at DI (discussing
an employee-owned company that keeps an "open-book" policy based on the belief
that the policy improves the firm's profits).
72. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1765-66.
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hold information that management would prefer to have.73 This lack
of trust may result from firm-specific "cultural" reasons, past mistakes
by management, or simply a traditional adversarial view of the work-
place.74 Similarly, management has incentives not to disclose informa-
tion related to their bargaining position, such as the firm's finances.
Both parties' unwillingness to share information has an impact on bar-
gaining over resource allocation. The presence of these significant in-
formation asymmetries produces inefficient outcomes for the firm.
Employee ownership potentially can remove these asymmetries by
giving employees increased access to firm information, while enhanc-
ing workers' incentive to reveal their own informational endow-
ments.75 By providing employee-owners with an equity interest in the
firm, an ESOP may reduce these asymmetries relative to alternative
structures. Equity in the firm increases employees' financial stake in
the firm's performance, as well as providing a more direct link be-
tween equity and performance, thereby increasing incentives to share
information that will benefit the firm.
a. Communication of Worker Preferences
and Financial Information
The informational advantages possessed by both labor and manage-
ment are often used by the parties strategically during negotiations.
These information asymmetries (e.g., an employer's inability to accu-
rately gauge employee preferences, and employees' lack of access to
financial data), however, may prevent an economically inefficient bar-
gaining outcome. If both parties obscure information, potential com-
promises that could allow a better outcome are not discussed.
Employee ownership can increase the chances of labor and manage-
ment sharing more information with each other.
Due to the strategic nature of labor bargaining, where both sides
typically move from extreme positions to an eventual compromise,
workers will often have incentives to misrepresent their preferences,
with management having the rational response of disbelieving such
claims.76 Worker claims regarding their preferences, such as trade-offs
between conditions and compensation, are often perceived by em-
ployers as being a strategic tactic, thereby diminishing their credibil-
ity.77 By making a stronger connection between firm performance
and employee compensation, employee ownership imposes more of
the costs of false claims on employees (in addition to costs already
73. See Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 159,
174 (1991).
74. Id. at 196-97.
75. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1766.
76. See id. at 1766-67.
77. See id. Similarly, employer claims about a firm's financial status often lack
credibility.
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imposed, such as those from strikes).7" Employee ownership, there-
fore, can remove the incentives for misrepresentation and lead to a
more efficient allocation of firm resources vis-it-vis worker
preferences.
As game theory illustrates, the ability to move to cooperative strate-
gies is vital to solving problems, such as the "prisoners' dilemma"
where enforcement and informational problems create losing situa-
tions for both sides.79 Traditional employment settings can create the
"prisoners' dilemma" where individuals have an incentive to shirk de-
spite a greater gain if all employees work harder.' An agreement
that encourages group cooperation can solve this bargaining prob-
lem.8' Employee ownership may facilitate this cooperation because
workers who have a share of the firm's equity may be more willing to
reveal their preferences in regard to productivity possibilities," bear-
ing risk,83 and tying compensation to productivity (e.g., merit pay).'
As a result of this incentive to share information, employee ownership
and supervision "may increase labor's share of the pie without con-
tracting capital's share."85
Given that many firms implement ESOPs as a solution to their fi-
nancial difficulties, the lack of trust by employees towards this type of
employer claim is important to the firm's future prosperity. An em-
ployer who wants to cut benefits in order to save the firm must have a
reliable means of passing financial information to employees. In a
typical adversarial relationship, however, employees will be quite
skeptical of employer claims of financial trouble.&' If an ESOP were
in place initially, employee representation on the board of directors
could be a source of trusted information that employees and manage-
ment could use to facilitate bargaining and necessary changes in labor
allocation.'
While employee ownership is not always associated with employee
representation, plans that were intended to address needs associated
with a rapidly changing market often have given employee-owners
78. These costs include the additional time spent on bargaining, as well as the
misallocation of resources that may occur with bargaining involving imperfect infor-
mation (e.g., bargaining failures).
79. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 15-69 (1984).
80. See Martin L. Weitzman & Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing and Productivity.
in Paying For Productivity: A Look at the Evidence 95, 98-100 (Alan S. Blinder ed.,
1990).
81. See Axelrod, supra note 79, at 15.
82. See Hyde, supra note 73, at 200.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 201.
85. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining, supra note 60, at 47.
86. See Stephen L. Hester, Employee Ownership: A Union View, in Labor Law
and Business Change: Theoretical and Transactional Perspectives 267, 271 (Samuel
Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988).
87. See id. at 273-74.
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board representation.8 8 Employee access to financial information
could be vital to a firm's attempt to alleviate financial problems or
adapt to a dynamic economic environment.8 9 Further, employee rep-
resentation on the board of directors can be a vehicle for sharing fi-
nancial information that employees are likely to trust.
By removing informational barriers such as the veracity of financial
distress, employee ownership may allow necessary concessions to oc-
cur, even when the firm is not in immediate distress.90 This improve-
ment in the bargaining environment is increasingly important for firms
that require frequent restructuring in the face of a dynamic economic
market.91 The increased uncertainty that accompanies firms in dy-
namic industries may make employee ownership particularly benefi-
cial in reducing information asymmetries that inhibit the ability of
these firms to change. 92
The frequency of bargaining breakdowns also should decrease as
bad faith is minimized and both parties' assumptions about the firm's
financial situation are closer to each other.93 Information asymme-
tries may prompt a lack of understanding on both sides, thereby in-
creasing the chances of a miscalculation of positions-even in the
absence of intentionally misleading claims-and creating higher bar-
gaining costs.94 If employee ownership increases communication and
access to information between labor and management, understanding
among the parties can increase. Therefore, even when information
from either side is not withheld or misleading, employee ownership
can reduce some bargaining costs.
Hansmann questions employee ownership's informational advan-
tages by stating that plans with significant employee control prevail in
workplaces such as law firms, where the information asymmetries are
relatively low.95 While his observation may be true, this evidence
does little to discount employee ownership's potential to increase the
incentives to share information. An inability to isolate the effects of
88. See Jeffrey Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The
Case of United Air Lines, in Proceedings of N.Y.U. 50th Annual Conference on Labor
(Samuel Estreicher ed., forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 23, on file with the Ford-
ham Law Review).
89. See id. (manuscript at 23).
90. See id. (manuscript at 15). The breakdown of these informational barriers can
occur through employees' increased access to the firm's financial information, or em-
ployees' reduced incentive to give false claims due to their greater stake in the firm.
See id. (manuscript at 14-15).
91. See id. (manuscript at 6).
92. See id. (manuscript at 19-20).
93. See id. (manuscript at 24).
94. See id. (manuscript at 21).
95. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1766 (stating that the small size of most law
firms and lack of hierarchy between management and the firm's professionals are
reasons that information sharing between management and professionals in such
firms would be high).
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employee ownership on firms with high asymmetries makes any con-
clusions speculative. Hansmann's criticism assumes that the choice of
investment structure is not affected by other factors, such as labor law,
which could limit employee ownership in spite of its advantages over
investor-owned firms. This Article argues that this assumption is un-
warranted and obtains no support from the prevalence of employee
ownership in unexpected areas, such as those with low information
asymmetries.
b. Agency Costs of Delegation to Management
A significant cost to many investor-owned firms is the hiring of
managers. Investors often have very little contact with the firm, re-
sulting in a high "agency cost of policing management." '96 Workers,
however, possess an obvious advantage in policing management over
investors with limited information about a firm. Both their intimate
knowledge of a firm and the financial incentive of worker-owners to
help the entire firm could lead to a significant decrease in the cost of
monitoring supervisors within worker-controlled firms. 7 Hansmann
contend that the lack of successful worker-owned firms in industries
that have high agency costs shows that this potential advantage is
overstated.98 Some anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that an in-
crease in employee ownership may create savings in the hiring of su-
pervisors. 99 While the precise magnitude of management savings is
unclear, these savings represent a potential benefit of increased em-
ployee ownership and control.
2. Mutual Monitoring
Companies are typically worried about workers failing to work as
hard as the firm would like. Thus, much of management's role is to
monitor workers in an attempt to limit this "shirking."1" Hansmann
points out that these monitoring costs will result in a "moral hazard"
problem; he contends that a firm only will agree to pay for a low level
of work, and employees only will work at this low level, even though
both parties may prefer a higher level of effort and correspondingly
higher compensation. 10 1 A stake in one's firm may result in employ-
96. Id. at 1768 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firnn Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ.
305 (1976)).
97. See Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 62; Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1768.
98. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1768-69.
99. See Edward S. Greenberg, Workplace Democracy: The Political Effects of
Participation 43-44 (1986).
100. Monitoring concerns also may be considered an information asymmetry. See
supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
101. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1761 n.48 (citation omitted). Moral hazard
problems depend on management being unable (or only able at a very high cost) to
discern between high and low levels of work. See id.
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ees monitoring their colleagues better than traditional supervisors,
thereby reducing shirking and its costs.102
Proponents of ESOPs contend that the shared costs of worker pro-
ductivity will increase employee-owners' incentives to limit shirking.
By spreading the residual claims of the firm's success among the em-
ployees, employee ownership forces employee-owners to bear some of
the costs of shirking, thereby reducing their incentive to work less.10 3
This gain is especially noticeable relative to investor-owned compa-
nies, which have higher monitoring costs.'i 4 The connection that em-
ployee ownership makes between the incentives of workers and the
firm also may lead to increased monitoring by employee-owners as
they attempt to encourage other employees to work at a higher level
of productivity. 05 The increased incentive for self and mutual moni-
toring can provide significant gains for the firm through increased effi-
ciency and lower monitoring costs. 106 The lack of financial
diversification associated with employee ownership also gives employ-
ees more incentive to work harder and increase monitoring than other
compensation systems that do not involve employee equity holdings in
the firm. 107
Furthermore, employee ownership may provide an opportunity for
employees to "work[ ] smarter, not just work[ ] harder." 108 The ability
to participate in the management of. one's workplace may increase
productivity because employee-owners have a heightened interest in
the work product and are more willing to invest their own time in
additional training.10 9 Contrary to Hansmann's law firm example,
Alan Hyde asserts that lawyers who have an ownership stake in their
firm will work "harder and smarter" than those under a traditional
management scheme.110
The potential advantage from increasing managerial competence,
using labor and machinery more efficiently, improving production
techniques, and enhancing worker performance makes employee
ownership an attractive means of saving monitoring resources."I ES-
102. See Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining, supra note 60, at 46.
103. See Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 Tax L. Rev. 363, 378
(1990).
104. See id. at 374-75.
105. See Haig R. Nalbantian, Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Sharing: Eco-
nomic and Psychological Perspectives on Employment Contracts 26 (1987).
106. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1762. The impact that employee-owners' work
has on firm performance, as well as the cost to monitor such workers, will affect the
potential savings implicated by employee ownership.
107. See Melton, supra note 103, at 381.
108. Hyde, supra note 73, at 183.
109. See id.; see also Schwab, supra note 71, (describing the increased willingness of
employee-owners to participate in training programs).
110. Hyde, supra note 73, at 197; see Robert L. Nelson, Partners With Power: The
Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm 184-88 (1988).
111. See Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 26).
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OPs, by tying employees' compensation directly to corporate perform-
ance, can lead to less shirking by employee-owners and increased
monitoring of others."' 2
Employee ownership is not, however, a cure for all of the ills of a
firm. Indeed, critics suggest that employee ownership may exacerbate
certain problems. Hansmann points out that worker ownership is
prevalent in easily-monitored service professions, like law." 3 More-
over, employee ownership could increase shirking by the original
owner-managers because the cost of their shirking has been spread to
employees.' 14 Also, if employee-owned firms used group-based
award systems more heavily, then shirking could actually increase be-
cause of the free-rider problem associated with a weak connection be-
tween work level and gains. 1 5 Cooperation among workers, however,
can create a corporate culture that reduces free-rider incentives, par-
ticularly in smaller firms." 6
As with most factors cited as a gain or cost of ESOPs, the net effect
on monitoring costs remains ambiguous." 7 What does seem clear is
that firm-specific characteristics may play a large part in the extent to
which monitoring savings will be realized through employee
ownership.
3. Reduction of Worker Lock-In
Employee ownership also may reduce the possibility of a worker
employed at a specific job for an extended period becoming "locked-
in" to that job. Potential causes of this phenomenon include workers
acquiring skills specialized to that job (thereby making them more
productive at that job than in the general labor market) and personal
attachments to a community."' The result is that a worker's costs to
leave a job may significantly increase over time, thereby allowing the
employer to pay the "locked-in" worker a lower wage.'1 9 Because
employees presumably have a personal interest in avoiding this effect,
112. See id. Tying compensation to share prices is, however, a weaker incentive
than others means, such as merit pay or bonuses, that are in the employer's control.
The lack of employer control over equity incentives may, however, provide a financial
incentive that is relatively free from employer interference, and is thereby more desir-
able for employees who believe that management will attempt to capture an unequal
share of the firm's growth (e.g., diverting financial profits to expansion or executive
salaries that would otherwise go toward increased worker compensation).
113. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1762-63. While he acknowledges evidence of
productivity gains in the plywood industry after employee ownership appeared, he
discounts its impact as being minor. See id. at 1763 n.54 (citation omitted).
114. See Melton, supra note 103, at 378-79.
115. See Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 61.
116. Id. at 61-63.
J17. This author is unaware of any empirical studies examining employee owner-
ship's effect on shirking costs.
118. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1764.
119. See id. Hansmann suggests the wage will be at the "next best alternative" for
the employee. See id- More specifically, an employer would only have to pay at the
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worker ownership can reduce the propensity of a firm to take advan-
tage of lock-in, assuming employee-owners will not collectively decide
to exploit older, and more locked-in, workers.120
Hansmann does not find any correlation between industries that ex-
perience more lock-in and worker-owned firms.' 2 ' He suggests that
large industrial and service firms, where lock-in is more likely to oc-
cur, have a lower rate of employee ownership than more mobile in-
dustries, which tend to be worker-owned (e.g., taxicabs drivers, refuse
collectors, and plywood industry laborers).2 2 Hansmann acknowl-
edges that reducing the exploitation of lock-in may be an important
ESOP incentive and that his anecdotal evidence is not conclusive.123
His use of only "survivalist" evidence fails to isolate the lock-in effect
while holding other factors, such as labor law, constant. Accordingly,
his correlation does not prove or disprove employee ownership's ef-
fect on lock-in exploitation. The impact of lock-in may be small either
way, but it still may contribute to ESOPs' superiority in certain firms.
4. Participation
In addition to the above factors, employees' participation in mana-
gerial policy-making may be beneficial to both the firm and its work-
ers. Seemingly minor influences, such as a daily reminder of the firm's
performance through the stock price, can emphasize employees' con-
nection with their workplace. 24 More importantly, the psychological
relationship between a worker and the firm becomes less adversarial
with increased worker control, leading to a potential improvement in
morale.' 25 An ESOP that provides significant control, versus mere
equity interests, could provide benefits to an employee-owned firm if
these psychological effects exist.
As discussed above, employees possess an intimate knowledge of
the production process. Employers' increasing attempts through "em-
ployee involvement" initiatives to gain access to such information is
evidence of the significance of this information asymmetry. 26 Em-
level of the next best alternative minus the additional costs entailed in locking-in the
employee. See id.
120. See id. Employee ownership could exacerbate lock-in by increasing the at-
tachment a worker has to her job. The key, however, is whether the firm will exploit
lock-in; mere attachment to work may be desired by both the employer and em-
ployee. Other employee-owners may be less willing to use the lock-in effect to lower
compensation for fellow employees.
121. See id. at 1764-65.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 1765.
124. See Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 29). But see id. (manuscript at 29
n.45) (noting that falling stock prices may discourage workers).
125. See P. Blumberg, Alienation and Participation: Conclusions, in Self-Manage-
ment: Economic Liberation of Man 324, 329-30 (Jaroslav Vanek ed., 1975).
126. See Hyde, supra note 73, at 198-99. The "Teamwork for Employees and Man-
agers Act of 1995," H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995), (TEAM Act) would have relaxed
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ployee ownership could give employees who feel they are participat-
ing in the firm's managerial process added incentive-beyond that
provided by their equity interest-to provide valuable production in-
formation to employers. The National Center for Employee Owner-
ship ("NCEO") has found that firms with employee participation in
decision-making have higher growth rates.127 The NCEO also has
stated that employees have better attitudes toward work as the
number of shares contributed to an ESOP increases.lza Other studies
have not been able to conclusively find a connection between ESOPs
and morale or productivity, 2 9 yet there is evidence that employee in-
fluence over firm decision-making, rather than mere ownership, may
increase participation and productivity. 13 1
Commentators also have suggested that employee-owned busi-
nesses lower absenteeism, reduce turnover, increase worker flexibility,
and lead to better care of equipment.' 3 ' "[Wjorkers as a whole are
motivated to strive for the success and growth of the enterprise when
they are equitably included in a transaction and their ownership
shares are accompanied by participation and communication.""'3
These participation effects are perhaps the most difficult to quantify,
yet they also may be the most important. If a company is able to
improve morale through an ESOP, it could achieve substantial
benefits.
labor law restrictions on employers setting up employee participation groups. The
TEAM Act was vetoed by President Clinton on July 30, 1996, 142 Cong. Rec. H8816
(1996), after passing the House 267-149,141 Cong. Rec. H9516 (1995), and the Senate
53-46, 142 Cong. Rec. S7614 (1996). See also Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involve-
ment and the "Company Union" Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 125, 127, 150 (1994) [hereinafter Estreicher,
Employee Involvement] (arguing for a partial repeal of section 8(a)(2) by limiting the
definition of "labor organization" to those that "bargain with" employers over work-
ing conditions).
127. See Hester, supra note 86, at 273 (citation omitted); see also U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Little Evidence of Effects on
Corporate Performance 30 (1987) (finding that worker participation in firm decision-
making may, in tandem with employee ownership, improve firm performance).
128. See Hester, supra note 86, at 273.
129. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 734 nA (citing U.S. General
Accounting Office, supra note 127, at 39-42 (reporting several studies that were incon-
clusive as to the causal relationship between employee ownership and increased mo-
rale and productivity)).
130. See id. (citing James O'Toole, The Uneven Record of Employee Ownership,
Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov-Dec. 1979, at 185, 194); see also Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 63
(arguing that employee ownership is most beneficial when implemented with changes
in decision-making policies such as increased employee input).
131. See Henry M. Levin, Employment and Productivi, of Producer Cooperatives,
in Worker Cooperatives in America 16, 26 (Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin eds.,
1984); cf Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 62-63 (discussing factors affecting whether em-
ployee ownership will increase economic performance).
132. Wilkus, supra note 18, at 25.
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The empirical literature suggests that employee participation has a
positive correlation with productivity.' 33 Within employee-owned
firms this productivity increase comes primarily from participation
closer to the "shop floor"-i.e., participation that deals with things
such as job redesigning or work groups. 134 Mere stock ownership and
share voting does not appear to produce significant productivity in-
creases.1 35 Ownership along with participation, however, appears to
lead to increased productivity. 136 It is important that an employee
ownership plan allow employee-owners to exert significant decision-
making influence in order to fully capitalize on the plan's potential.
5. Job Security
Another possible advantage of employee ownership is increased job
security. In addition to the security that improved firm performance
provides, employee ownership that includes employee participation in
management and board representation can give employees better in-
formation and improve union bargaining power, resulting in further
job security gains. It is likely that employee representation on a cor-
porate board could provide quicker notice of a firm's fiscal troubles,
thereby allowing faster and more effective worker concessions that
may save the company. 137 A union can also bargain for alternatives
that are more beneficial to employees by gaining access to a com-
pany's financial strategies and the valuable information contained
therein.
The evidence of increased job security, however, is not robust. Yet,
while it seems that employee-owned companies are still willing to
"downsize" in the face of economic realities, they may be more apt to
delay or minimize job elimination than investor-owned firms. 38 If
employees perceive ownership as a connection between their well-be-
ing and the firm's, controversies surrounding lay-offs may decrease.
133. See U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 127, at 30; Blasi et al., supra
note 8, at 63.
134. See David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and
the Firm's Environment, in Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, supra
note 80, at 183, 203.
135. See Michael A. Conte & Jan Svejnar, The Performance Effects of Employee
Ownership Plans, in Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, supra note 80,
at 143, 167 (stating that "participation groups improve company performance in an
employee ownership setting, though share voting and board representation do not");
see also Levine & Tyson, supra note 134, at 198 (finding that studies showed that high-
participation firms outperformed low-participation firms, on average, by 15% in
terms of output per worker-i.e., productivity).
136. See Levine & Tyson, supra note 134, at 203. It is not clear, however, to what
extent ownership and participation together provide greater benefits than participa-
tion alone.
137. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 779.
138. See Uchitelle, supra note 8, at 3. It is not clear what effect such delay has had
on the firms or the employees' long-term security.
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Employee-owners can attempt to minimize job losses, thereby reduc-
ing hostility if downsizing becomes a financial reality.
B. Costs of Employee Ownership
While employee ownership provides significant benefits to a firm, it
creates costs as well. Similar to ownership benefits, the costs of ES-
OPs are difficult to quantify with any precision. Several costs associ-
ated with employee ownership, however, are identifiable. These
include increased employee financial risk, internal governance
problems, and the "horizon problem."
1. Increase in Employee Financial Risk
Alan Hyde states that "risk aversion is the single greatest problem
with employee ownership and the single greatest obstacle to its wider
spread.'139 If employees' pensions and personal wealth are tied up in
the same company as employees' wages, their finances are severely
underdiversified."4 Given that most employees do not own stock or
have other significant savings, tying both their present and future in-
come to one company can be a significant disincentive to employee
ownership.' 4 '
Hyde describes risk diversification as the major reason for the lack
of employee ownership in companies which do not have political or
professional dispositions towards such plans.142 He argues that em-
ployee ownership often involves companies that are financially trou-
bled because employees are willing to take on the added risk of
ownership only when the firm is in trouble.143 Additionally, the lack
of diversification and transferability of ESOP equity (which occurs
due to both the time it takes to release the ESOP stock to employees
and requirements of many plans that sales of such stock be made only
within the firm) reduces the value of the stock to employee-owners,
especially in privately-held companies.'" The result is underdiversi-
fled savings for employees, made up of equity that they value less than
conventional common stock (which has no limits on cashing-out).
139. Hyde, supra note 73, at 205-06. Workers already submit themselves to a great
deal of risk through employment-at-vill contracts and the threat of termination
through union contracts. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1773.
140. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1772.
141. See Hyde, supra note 73, at 203-08; see also Hester, supra note 86, at 269-70
(stating that most unions will not substitute employee stock ownership plans or de-
fined contribution plans for the traditional defined benefit pension plans).
142. See Hyde, supra note 73, at 207.
143. See id.; see also id. at 207 n.157 (giving possible solutions to reduce employee
risk).
144. See Melton, supra note 103, at 380-81. Most ESOPs, in both public and private
firms, limit the transferability of stock by employee-owners, in large part to keep the
stock in the hands of company insiders. See id.
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Further risk is also incurred due to the buy-back requirement of
most ESOPs. For privately-held companies, the ESOP is obligated to
repurchase shares of employees who leave. 45 This means that suc-
cessful companies will face added costs when employees seek to cash-
out earlier than expected. If this buy-back obligation cannot be met,
the ESOP has a higher chance of failing, thereby increasing the risk
associated with underdiversification. 146
Hansmann contends that this problem is overstated; he argues that
risk diversification in employee-owned firms is not much different
from that in investor-owned firms with at-will employment con-
tracts.147 Hyde counters by stating that "[n]o goal has shaped union
bargaining behavior more over the last fifty years than the protection
of employees from risk and insecurity.' 1 48 Indeed, as Hansmann
points out, even union employees face termination in bad times.14 9
Therefore, the tying of employee pensions and savings into the firm
sometimes will, it seems, be a significant deterrence to employee own-
ership. While the magnitude of the effect of under-diversification on
the initiation of employee ownership plans may be in doubt, this con-
cern seems to be a significant factor in unions' reluctance to initiate an
ESOP. The ultimate question is whether the benefits of employee
ownership, including possible gains in job security, are strong enough
to offset the risks associated with under-diversification. Unions, if
they gain the proper expertise, may provide an invaluable resource to
employees in attempting to evaluate this trade-off.
2. Internal Governance Inefficiencies
Collective governance, which Hansmann suggests is the most seri-
ous problem resulting from employee ownership, poses several possi-
ble efficiency losses for the firm. Typically, an employee-owned firm
will allow voting by employee-owners on major firm decisions.'"0
Hansmann contends that a greater use of collective governance,
stressing employee input over traditional managerial schemes, will re-
sult in more inefficient decisions by the firm. 151
145. See I.R.C. § 409(h)(1) (1994) (giving a participant in a private-held employee-
owned firm the "right to require that the employer repurchase employer securities
under a fair valuation formula"); see also Rosen, supra note 8, at 18 (recommending
that the cost of a repurchase obligation plan be considered when companies create an
ESOP).
146. See Tim Jones, Fast Slide on Flip Side of Success: Generous Employee Plan
Costs Peoria Paper Dearly, Chi. Trib., Sept. 18, 1995, § 4, at 1 (describing an early sell-
out by employee-owners that endangered a successful ESOP).
147. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1773 (stating that despite "this seeming anom-
aly[,] ... for many workers investor-owned enterprise may not offer strikingly less risk
than does worker-owned enterprise").
148. Hyde, supra note 73, at 205.
149. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1773.
150. See id. at 1779.
151. See id. at 1779-82.
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The first possible source of collective governance costs is the diver-
gence among employee-owners over issues such as wage allocation.152
Majority voting as a decision-making tool may present a potential
inefficiency in the governance process.153 If the median voter's inter-
ests, which ultimately win under majority rule, differ from the mean
voter's, deviations from the optimal outcome will result. This criticism
of employee ownership, however, compares the collective governance
structure to an optimal structure that probably does not exist. The
real question is not how collective governance compares to the ideal,
rather it is how employee control compares to the alternative, inves-
tor-run structure. As Hansmann admits when discussing employee-
appointed boards, the voting mechanism for boards of directors is
generally majority rule,'54 which suffers from the same problem as col-
lective governance, although the severity of the problem may be mini-
mized by the more homogenous interests of shareholders. Whether
this inefficiency creates significant costs is uncertain, however.
Hansmann asserts that conflicts of interest among workers can be
more severe than between stockholders, which are muted by corpo-
rate law's success in resolving conflicts between shareholders. 5  For
this assertion to be true, workers must have more heterogeneous pref-
erences (e.g., job security v. wages) than investors, and this heteroge-
neity must result in efficiency losses greater than those under investor
governance. Hansmann, however, fails to cite any real evidence that
this increased conflict actually translates into significant efficiency
losses or evidence that employees' heterogeneous interests have in
fact hobbled employee ownership experiments that have occurred.
The evidence that Hansmann does provide is that employee owner-
ship is found typically in firms with homogenous workforces, such as
legal services and plywood industries.'56 It is not clear, however, that
these industries are as homogenous as he suggests; for instance, few
law firms compensate all of their partners equally. t5' Moreover, it is
possible that the equity sharing of employee ownership will mute the
collective governance costs of firms that do have a heterogeneous
workforce. The governance-cost theory does not appear to ade-
quately explain the prevalence or lack of employee ownership in cer-
tain industries 58 and, without more evidence, remains unsatisfying as
an explanation of the lack of observed employee ownership.
152. As Hansmann notes, this problem could be avoided if such decisions were
keyed to objective measures. See id. at 1789-90.
153. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Current Developments in the Theory of Social
Choice, in Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow: Social Choice and Justice 162, 167-
70 (1983) (discussing incentives for voter misrepresentation).
154. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1779-81.
155. See, e.g., id at 1782 (discussing insider trading prohibitions).
156. See id. at 1783.
157. See Hyde, supra note 73, at 169 n.35.
158. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1783-84.
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Hansmann also suggests that maintaining a collective governance
system, in addition to the decisions it produces, generates added costs.
He argues that additional costs may be imposed on the firm as a result
of resources needed to obtain information for collective governance
participation 159 and to counter employee strategic behavior (e.g., hid-
ing information),'160 as well as the transaction costs incurred through
voting cycles. 16 1 Once again, these costs may be divergences from an
optimal model, but they are present in traditional governance struc-
tures as well. Employee-owners also are likely to delegate some deci-
sion-making to an executive, just like a traditional firm.
Investor-owned firms simply are not the ideal that Hansmann sug-
gests when he compares them to collectively-governed firms. 62 Fur-
thermore, there is little more than anecdotal evidence to support his
contention that "worker ownership works best when there is minimal
opportunity for conflicts of interest among the worker-owners." 163
Even if he is correct, the magnitude of the costs is uncertain and, at a
minimum, suggests that, in firms with relatively homogenous em-
ployee interests, collective governance will not generate significant
costs.16
4
One source of costs that may occur is the initial fixed costs required
to obtain information. Just as a union must acquire financial informa-
tion before implementing an ESOP, workers who wish to participate
in managerial decisions must make an investment in learning about
managerial policy. The question will turn then on whether this invest-
ment is a wise one.
Collective governance costs associated with employee ownership
represents a potential cost to employee-owned firms, but evidence as
to its actual effect is equivocal. Organizational inefficiencies could be
a significant problem for employee ownership, yet there is no strong
empirical evidence that ESOPs differ significantly from investor-run
firms in this regard except for Hansmann's survival accounts-i.e.,
what set of organizational forms have prevailed over time. Addition-
ally, the magnitude of this problem must be viewed in light of em-
ployee-owned firm's over-all performance vis-A-vis investor-owned
firms. As discussed below, evidence of the efficiency of employee-
owned firms counters the claim that collective governance is inher-
ently inferior to investor-owned firms.'65
159. See id. at 1781-82.
160. See id. at 1781.
161. See id.
162. See Hyde, supra note 73, at 169 n.35.
163. Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1784.
164. The NLRB's unit determination process often results in homogenous units.
See Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 Va. L. Rev. 353, 409 (1984).
165. See infra Part II.C.
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3. Horizon Problem
Because employee-owners' stock is not usually as liquid as common
stock, (participants must often wait until they leave the firm to sell-
out, or at least sell to other employees) some academics have sug-
gested that incentives for projects with long-term pay-offs will be re-
duced.'66 This "horizon problem" results from the inability of
employees' stock to accurately value long-term gains, creating a situa-
tion that favors present consumption over investment. 67 The result is
a company that fails to make proper long-term investments, thereby
hurting its financial prospects.
The loss in liquidity, as Hansmann notes, does not appear to be seri-
ous. The ability to sell to new workers, or sell when leaving, seems to
provide the necessary incentives for long-term investments.168 Even if
some individual worker preferences have short horizons, the median
worker horizon will mirror their expected tenure, which is generally
long enough to maintain long-term investment projects.1 69 While the
value of investment to employee-owners is important, the horizon
problem does not appear to result in a significant divergence in will-
ingness to undertake long-term investments between employee-
owned and investor-owned companies.
C. Performance Data
While breaking down the individual benefits and costs of ESOPs is
important, the most significant factor in measuring the efficacy of em-
ployee ownership is the company's performance. Examining whether
employee-owned firms perform better than investor-owned ones will
reveal whether employee ownership can offer a real advantage. Such
data, however, is very difficult to obtain. As illustrated by Hyde's de-
scription of when ESOPs are beneficial-i.e., "sometimes" 17 0-firm-
specific factors may govern the profitability of a company changing to
employee ownership. These characteristics often will influence
whether a firm chooses an ESOP, thereby blurring the causation be-
tween employee ownership and profitability.1 71 Firm-specific factors
make the attempt to isolate and measure employee ownership's ef-
fects on firm performance very difficult. These variables include firm
166. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Func-
tions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermiination, 52 J. Bus. 469,
486 (1985) [hereinafter Jensen & Meckling, Rights] (discussing the non-marketability
feature of employee-owned stock).
167. See Hansmann, supra note 1, at 1774.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Hyde, supra note 73, at 174.
171. See Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 63.
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size, employee characteristics, policy-making structure, technology,
and labor-relations history.172
According to a recent survey of past studies' measurement of per-
formance differences between ESOP and non-ESOP firms, 85% of
companies with ESOPs had higher productivity than investor-owner
firms. 73 When comparing a firm's productivity before and after im-
plementation of an ESOP, 82% of the companies had increased pro-
ductivity after employee ownership was created. 174
In this study of ESOP performance, Blasi, Conte, and Kruse com-
pare public companies with ESOPs against those without.1 75 The
study used four different measures of performance: "return on equity,
return on total earning assets, price/earnings ratio, and profit mar-
gin.' 1 76 The authors concluded that, among firms of the same size,
employee-owned firms had significantly higher growth in returns on
assets and equity, and had higher profit margins.' 77 Evidence that
productivity increases as a result of ESOP implementation was
weaker, but they concluded that where differences did exist, em-
ployee-owned firms tended to perform better.1 78 Also, the most ro-
bust connection between ESOPs and productivity was found in
smaller companies. 179 The authors' conclusion seems to affirm Hyde's
"sometimes" theory; there is no automatic productivity increase after
implementing an ESOP, but if there is a change it will tend to be for
the better, particularly if the company is smaller.' 80
172. See id.
173. See id. The average magnitude was 6.2% higher productivity, with 19% of the
estimates statistically significant (below a p-value of 0.05). See id.
174. See id. The average productivity increase was 4.4%, with 17% of the estimates
having p-values below 0.05. See id. Only one study found a statistically significant
positive effect of a substantial magnitude (1.8%-2.7% higher productivity for each
year). See Subal C. Kumbhakar & Amy E. Dunbar, The Elusive ESOP-Productivity
Link, 52 J. Pub. Econ. 273, 273 (1993). Blasi, Conte, and Kruse note, however, that
statistical analysis of the aggregate of these studies rejects the null hypothesis that
ESOP implementation has no effect on productivity. See Blasi et al., supra note 8, at
63.
175. See Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 65 (defining an "ESOP" firm as one with over
5% of the equity market value held by an employee ownership plan, as per the SEC
definition of a major stakeholder). Productivity is the marginal product of each em-
ployee, measured by sales or value added per employee. The study also controlled for
the level of employment and capital/labor ratios. See id.
176. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
177. See id. at 71.
178. See id. at 78. For example, employee ownership of greater than 5% is associ-
ated with a 15% increase in value-added per employee. See id. at 71. Moreover, they
found that concessions by employees had no effect on productivity. See id.
179. See id. at 77.
180. See id. at 77-78; see also supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (citing
various inconclusive studies concerning the effects of ESOPs on moral and productiv-
ity). Hyde's theory, while not conclusive, suggests the following traits for a firm that
would most benefit from employee ownership:
1. high conflicts of interests between managers and employees.
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Although a precise conclusion as to ESOPs' efficacy is lacking,
some generalizations may be offered. Smaller firms with low trust
may be the most promising companies for employee ownership gains.
In companies that do not share these characteristics, however, em-
ployee ownership may improve performance in some cases, and rarely
imposes significant costs to the firm. The structure of the ESOP is
also important, as gains often require that employee ownership be ac-
companied by changes in the policy-making structure, particularly
measures giving employee-owners increased participation. t81 It
seems, therefore, that many firms could greatly benefit from a change
to employee ownership.
Attempts to judge employee ownership's efficacy are still met with
evidence indicating that the actual level of employee ownership is less
than one might expect given the theoretical advantages of ESOPs. It
is possible that the advantages of employee ownership have been
overstated, yet the empirical data shows that, for certain firms, em-
ployee ownership leads to real gains.
Other factors may be reducing the level of employee ownership.
One of these factors may be labor law's regulation of employee own-
ership. Because of unions' comparative advantage as employee repre-
sentatives in ESOP initiation and negotiations, they will often be
involved in plans that implicate employee control. Union involve-
ment in these plans, as well as some individual action, 1' will implicate
labor law; any obstacles imposed could significantly influence the level
of employee ownership in the United States. Labor law obstacles may
also affect the structure of employee ownership plans. These obsta-
cles often result in plans that are not as beneficial to the firm and
employees as they could be if freed of the restraints of the present
regulatory scheme. The impact of labor law on employee ownership
must, therefore, be examined by those who wish to study employee
ownership's efficacy, as well as by those who are concerned about the
form and quantity of plans implemented.
III. LABOR LAW PROBLEMS
The prevalence of firms that have benefited from ESOPs and the
promise that other firms could profit in the future portend a continu-
ing growth in employee ownership. Unions, however, still remain
2. low trust between managers and employees, as a result of ideological,
cultural, or firm-specific factors.
3. suboptimum employment contracting as a "solution" to these problems;
that is employement "conventions" that instituionalize:
a. low incentives for employee productivity, or
b. high unnecessary supervision costs; or
c. inefficient allocation of risks.
Hyde, supra note 73, at 195.
181. See supra notes 130, 136.
182. For example, employee solicitation for an ESOP.
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uninvolved with employee ownership unless a firm is in financial
trouble. Labor organizations' resistance to initiating employee owner-
ship plans seem to come in part from a traditional view of their role in
the workplace. Yet, the growing desire of business for increased
worker input, as well as possible gains to the firm through employee
ownership, are making ESOPs hard for unions to ignore. What re-
mains to be explored are the external barriers that may prevent un-
ions183 from increasing their role in employee ownership. One
concern is the regulation of employee ownership by labor law and its
potential effect on labor's ability to initiate and shape the growth of
ESOPs. Labor law's regulation of employee ownership, therefore,
may be an important factor in unions' reluctance to become involved
in such plans. If labor law is a significant obstacle to employee owner-
ship, it may be possible to enact reforms that allow employers, em-
ployees, and unions to benefit from employee ownership, while
remaining faithful to traditional labor concerns.
A. Are Employee Solicitations for Employee Ownership
Covered Under Section 7?
If a union, or an individual employee, wishes to implement em-
ployee ownership, it must both garner support from the employees
and bargain with the employer. Depending on the structure of the
ESOP, labor law may pose obstacles to such solicitation attempts. In
particular, NLRB interpretations of the NLRA have not protected
against employer retaliation attempts to initiate ESOPs with signifi-
cant employee control-features arguably necessary for many of the
potential benefits of employee ownership."84
Employers or managers often will seek to protect their managerial
power by resisting employee ownership plans involving employee con-
trol. Managers who wish to scuttle solicitation attempts have many
means to accomplish their goal, including enforcement of no-solicita-
tion rules, refusals to bargain, or even dismissals of employees sup-
porting the plan. These decisions to resist employee ownership may
not be the most beneficial for the firm. Because managers typically
value their stock-option shares less than outside investors value their
shares, there may be a gap between managerial and investor inter-
ests.'85 This differing valuation can mitigate, or perhaps adversely af-
fect, a significant goal of stock-options-to increase managers'
conformity to outside investors' preferences. Managers also may have
183. Because labor organizations usually are involved in employee-initiated ES-
OPs, this Article will generally refer to unions. It will be noted, however, where the
law treats actions by individual employees different from actions of unions
184. See Blasi et al., supra note 8, at 63.
185. See Melton, supra note 103, at 377 (arguing that extra risk and transfer restric-
tions makes "the value the manager assigns to his shares.., less than that assigned to
the shares by outside investors").
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individual interests, such as their salary or job security, that leads
them to make decisions that benefit their interests over that of the
firm.18 6 Employers, and particularly managers, may, therefore, resist
attempts to decrease their control over firm policy, even where in-
creased employee control may benefit the firm as a whole. Employee
control, therefore, can provide a correction to these misaligned inter-
ests by moving the firm in the direction it would have gone if manager
interests were better aligned with those of the firm.
In order to prevent such resistance, an unfair labor practice must be
found, typically for the interference with employees' section 71t 1
rights, as enforced through section 8(a)(1).l1 Section 7 of the NLRA
states, in part, that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection ....
Because ESOPs (or their trusts, ESOTs) are not considered labor
organizations, 19 solicitation for employee ownership must fall under
the "mutual aid or protection" clause of section 7 to be protected. In
order for an activity to be considered "mutual aid or protection," the
Board must hold that it is both concerted and protected. This test was
defined in NLRB v. Oakes Machine Corp. 9' as being satisfied if: "(1)
the employee's activity was concerted; (2) the employer was aware of
its concerted nature; (3) the activity was 'protected' by the act; and (4)
186. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Tax-
ation, 105 Yale L.J. 325, 337 (1995) (noting that one cause for the lack of managerial
resistance to double taxation vis-A-vis shareholders is that "[mianagers may pursue
investment strategies designed not to maximize profits but to secure their positions
and increase their salaries" (citation omitted)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Ver-
sus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1. 35 (1986) (stating,
in the takeover context, that "managers had declined to adopt their shareholders'
preferences with respect to the issues of risk, growth, and the optimal payout of earn-
ings, until the takeover forced them to do so"); Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargain-
ing Theory of the Finn, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 540,571 (1995) (stating that "managers and
shareholders will have a conflict of interest ... [where] individual interests conflict
with the collective interest in reaching a bargain as quickly and as cheaply as possible"
(citation omitted)).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
188. See id. § 158(a)(1) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
§ 157 of this title").
189. Id § 157.
190. See id § 152(5) (stating that a "'labor organization' means any organization
... which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work").
191. 897 F.2d 84, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding an employee's letter, complaining of
the company president's actions, to be protected as an activity aimed at replacing a
supervisor, which was directly related to the terms and conditions of employment).
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the discharge or other adverse personnel action was motivated by the
protected activity."' 92
Typically, when an employee or union supports employee owner-
ship, the "concerted" prong of the section 7 test is not in dispute.
While individual activity is often not covered by section 7, the Board
has stated that activity is concerted when it "encompasses those cir-
cumstances where individual employees seek to initiate or to induce
or to prepare for group action .... ",19 An individual employee who
advocates an ESOP to fellow employees is clearly seeking to induce
group action and the action is, therefore, considered to be concerted
under section 7.194 The more significant concern for employee owner-
ship is whether solicitation for such plans is protected. Although a
proposed ESOP that does not implicate significant employee control
poses few concerns, attempts to gain control over the company have
not been well received by the Board.
The "mutual aid and protection" analysis requires that the activity
in question promote a section 7 objective. 19 5 While solicitation for
employee ownership appears to fall under the "mutual aid and protec-
tion" clause, the Supreme Court has held that section 7's scope is lim-
ited by the requirement that the objective of the concerted activity
must pertain to employees acting in their interests as employees. In
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,196 the Court found that distribution of a union
newsletter protesting the President's veto of a higher minimum wage,
as well as Texas' Right-to-Work statute, was protected under section
7.197 The Court stated that an individual employee's actions are pro-
tected within the "mutual aid or protection" provision of section 7
when the activity relates to "employees' interests as employees;"'198 a
determination left in the first instance to the Board.199 The Board has
192. Id. at 88.
193. Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986) (holding that an individual
employee's refusal to drive an unsafe vehicle was not concerted activity). Compare
Burle Indus., Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 498, 501-03 (1990) (holding that an employee's in-
quiries into other employees' physical well-being after a chemical leak was concerted
activity), and Frank Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding
that filing racial discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission constituted concerted activity), with Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB,
330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding that an employee's repeated advising to
other employees as to their rights under the collective bargaining agreement was not
concerted activity).
194. See Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1992) (hold-
ing that an individual employee's ESOP solicitation was unprotected under section 7,
but noting that "[t]here is no question that [the individual's] activities were
concerted").
195. See supra text accompanying note 189.
196. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
197. See id. at 569-70.
198. Id. at 565-68.
199. See id. at 568; see also G & W Elec. Specialty Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1137
(1965) (holding that an employee's solicitation of signatures for a petition that ad-
dressed the operation of the employee credit union was protected concerted activity,
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held that the "mutual aid or protection" clause is to be interpreted
more broadly than mandatory subjects of bargaining (wages, hours,
and conditions of employment);2 0 otherwise, "the phrase 'or other
mutual aid or protection' [would be read] out of the Act."2 0
The Board confronted the issue of whether solicitation for em-
ployee ownership is protected, concerted activity under section 7 in
Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino.2 2 In Harrah's, Larry George, a
casino dealer, distributed literature that encouraged employees to
support a leveraged buy-out of their employer through an ESOP
purchase of 50% of the firm's stock. 0 3 George placed his flyers near
company newsletters, in the employee lounge, and in the cafeteria. 204
He was then dismissed because management stated that his flyers vio-
lated company policy against distributions in work areas such as the
cafeteria.2 "5
The central issue in the case was whether George's activities were
considered "mutual aid or protection" under section 7.11 The Gen-
eral Counsel argued that Harrah's had committed unfair labor prac-
tices by telling George how he could solicit, by firing him, and by
while finding it unnecessary to adopt the Trial Examiner's suggestion that the credit
union was a mandatory bargaining subject), modified by G & W Elec. Specialty Co. v.
NLRB, 300 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1966).
200. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a) (1994); infra Part III.B.
201. G & W Elec, 154 N.L.R.B. at 1138 (footnote omitted). However, the Board
does not appear to be following this distinction, as a comparison of part III.A and part
III.B of this Article will reveal.
202. 307 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1992).
203. George proposed that the ESOP trust, which held 1% of the company's stock
at the time, borrow $335 million in order to buy 50% of the company's outstanding
(publicly traded) stock. He also wanted the company to shift 50% of its corporate
debt to the trust, which would be paid back by the firm's future income. George
believed that this plan would save the company $31 million in taxes. See id. at 184.
The flyer was titled "Money For Nothin"' and stated in part:
Our ESOP Trust borrows money from a commercial bank to buy 50% of
[the firm's] stock for the employees.
Since the employees then own 50% of the stock, we get 50% of the oper-
ating income ("profits").
For the following 10 to 15 years, we use our share of the profits to pay off
the bank loan.
At the end of 10 years, each employee owns stock which could be worth as
much as 3 times his annual earnings (salary plus tips). If we leave sooner, we
get less. If we stay longer, we get more .... [The benefits include] par-
ticipatory management ... [such as] morale, productivity, and profitability.
Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, No. 32-CA-11182, 1992 NLRB LEXIS 482, at
*9-*10 (Apr. 21, 1992) (unpublished dissent) (Member Devaney, dissenting).
204. See Harrah's, 307 N.L.R.B. at 184. In fact, some flyers were placed in the
company newsletter, but George denied any involvement. See id. at 185.
205. See id. George was later reinstated after promising to allow the company to
review any future literature distributed by him and to follow the no-distribution pol-
icy. See id. at 185-86.
206. See iL at 182.
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making him clear future solicitations after his reinstatement. 20 7 The
Administrative Law Judge ("AL") found, and the Board agreed, that
the objective of the proposal "was to transfer ownership and control
of the Respondent to the employees."2'8 Because "any benefits...
would flow to employees' presupposed corporate ownership," the em-
ployer did not violate the NLRA by firing George for his solicita-
tion. 0 9 The Board found that "the proposal does not advance
employees' interests as employees but rather advances employees' in-
terests as entrepreneurs, owners, and managers."210
The ALJ, upon whom the Board decision relied, based his findings
on the fact that ESOP benefits presupposed ownership and that
George's plan was an attempt to change the corporate structure.2 1 1
The holding relied on Nephi Rubber Products Corp.,12 where, after a
business shut down, several ex-employees attempted to create an
ESOP to purchase the company. When a competing enterprise
bought the company, the new owners refused to hire the employees
who had pushed for the ESOP. 213 The Nephi Board held that these
ex-employees were acting solely as entrepreneurs, not as employees,
and their conduct was not protected by section 7.114 In Harrah's, the
Board reasoned that the sought-for 50% ownership would necessarily
involve a change in corporate control similar to Nephi, leaving
George's solicitation unprotected.1 5
There are several problems with the Harrah's analysis. One is the
Board's premise that "current employees would not enjoy any of the
envisioned benefits unless and until they, through the ESOP, effec-
tively controlled the corporation." ' 6 This assumption ignores the fact
that many, if not most, ESOPs do not involve voting rights for most
managerial decisions.2 17 While George's proposal mentioned "par-
207. See id. 186-87 (noting the future clearance charge was the only violation found
by the Board).
208. Harrah's, 1992 NLRB LEXIS 482, at *6 (Member Devaney, dissenting). The
dissent disagreed with this characterization, arguing that George was only trying to
improve the employee's financial stake and had shown no interest in managerial con-
trol as such. See id. at *9 (Member Devaney, dissenting).
209. Id. at *6 (Member Devaney, dissenting)
210. Harrah's, 307 N.L.R.B. at 182. Some attempts to change management, how-
ever, can be protected. See NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir.
1990) (finding activity opposing a supervisor to be protected if, inter alia, the supervi-
sor dealt directly with employees and conditions of employment).
211. See Harrah's, 307 N.L.R.B. at 186.
212. 303 N.L.R.B. 151, 158 (1991) (finding activity not to be protected by section 7
because it was "designed solely for the purpose of influencing or producing changes in
the management hierarchy" (citing Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 208 N.L.R.B. 356,
357 (1974))).
213. See Nephi, 303 N.L.R.B. at 158. The Board decided the successorship issue by
holding the new firm to be a successor. See id. at 156-57.
214. See id. at 158.
215. See Harrah's, 307 N.L.R.B. at 182.
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 67
LABOR LAW OBSTACLES
ticipatory management," its primary objective was to increase em-
ployee compensation.2 18 Under George's ESOP, it was quite possible
that the employees could benefit financially (i.e, by obtaining im-
proved job security) from their stock ownership, yet possess little or
no managerial voice.
A more significant problem is the degree of sought-after managerial
control thought necessary to preclude section 7 protection. If employ-
ees believe that their firm would benefit from increased employee
control, what can they do to push for this change? The Nephi ruling
was based on Good Samaritan Hospital & Health Center2l 19 and Retail
Clerks Union Local 770, Retail Clerks International Association,"
both of which precluded section 7 protection for activity that was
designed solely to influence or change management. 2-' The Board, in
Good Samaritan, had ruled that such employee pressure would be al-
lowable as long as it was not designed solely to change the managerial
structure.' In Retail Clerks, six employees had actively opposed the
election of the new company president, and took steps such as stuffing
envelopes and distributing literature for the new president's oppo-
nent.223 The president fired the six employees, which the Board ruled
was not a section 8(a)(1) violation because employees "ha[ve] no pro-
tected right to engage in activities designed solely for the purpose of
... producing changes in the management hierarchy." - ' While activ-
ity designed solely to change management may not be appropriate for
union economic pressure, it does not follow that activity primarily ad-
dressed to employee concerns, but to be accomplished through
changes in management should also be prohibited.
As Harrah's dissent points out, the Board appeared to ignore the
"solely" requirement of Nephi and Retail Clerks.2'- In particular, the
Harrah's Board claimed that, despite being factually distinguishable,
"the underlying rationale [of Good Samaritan] ... supports our deci-
218. See Harrah's, 1992 NLRB LEXIS 482, at *9 (unpublished dissent) (Member
Devaney, dissenting).
219. 265 N.L.R.B. 618, 626 (1982) (finding no section 8(a)(1) violation for firing
two employees who complained about their manager's performance because the em-
ployees' objective, to change the managerial philosophy of their supervisor, was
"outside the objectives of the mutual aid or protection provisions of the [NLRAI").
220. 208 N.L.R.B. 356 (1974).
221. See Good Samaritan, 265 N.L.R.B. at 626-27; Retail Clerks Union, 208
N.L.R.B. at 357.
222. See 265 N.L.R.B. at 626.
223. See 208 N.L.R.B. at 356.
224. Id. at 357.
225. See 1992 NLRB LEXIS 482, at *8-*9 (Member Devaney, dissenting). The
Board recognized, however, that "[tlhe dissent correctly points out that George's pro-
posal envisioned enhanced benefits for current employees and was not designed
solely to product [sic] changes in management." Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino,
307 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1992). The Board, however, still relied on the Good Samaritan
progeny, arguing for its application because the proposal would "fundamentally...
change how and by whom the corporation would be managed." Id.
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sion in this case. '22 6 Good Samaritan, however, clearly states that the
non-protected activities "were not directed to improve their lot as em-
ployees, but were instead an effort on their part to affect the ultimate
direction, philosophy, and managerial policies of Respondent. 2 2 7
Harrah's reliance on these cases is perplexing, given that George's
motivation was clearly intended to improve the employees' "lot" as
employees.2 28 The Board, in the same year as Harrah's, stated that
section 7 coverage depends not on "the mere potential.. . for a voice
or control [over firm decision-making,] .... Rather, it is [the] actual
control or an effective voice" 229 that is significant. One could argue
over the extent to which George sought management control, but the
facts of the case clearly illustrate that his primary concern was for in-
creased compensation. 30 Through Harrah's, the Board appears to be
eliminating section 7 coverage for any ESOP proposal that was
designed to change the employee-employer relationship.2 3' The
Board's treatment of the facts in Harrah's also suggests a rule that
excludes section 7 protection for activity implicating merely the poten-
tial of managerial control, even where the employee's central aim is to
increase compensation. Under either interpretation, the test for pro-
tected objectives established in Harrah's seems to raise a far more
restrictive hurdle than had been the case under prior Board law.
As stated above, the Board assumes that "any 50-percent share-
holder, including an ESOP trust, would as a practical matter exercise
effective control .... 232 This leaves open the question of what level
of potential control will eliminate a proposal's protection under the
NLRA. In Harrah's, the ESOP would not have had a majority stake
226. Harrah's, 307 N.L.R.B. at 182.
227. 265 N.L.R.B. at 626 (footnote omitted).
228. George's flyer, titled "Money for Nothin'," described his plan to obtain 50%
of the employer' stock through an ESOP, which he explicitly claimed would increase
employees' compensation once the debt was paid. See supra note 203.
229. Science Applications Int'l Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 373, 376 (1992). The Board
rejected the employer's argument that employees holding less than 1% of the com-
pany stock should not be allowed to organize because of the potential for gaining
managerial control, on grounds that employees sought no changes in management
hierarchy. See id. at 374-76.
230. See supra note 203.
231. See Science Applications, 309 N.L.R.B. at 376. In Science Applications, the
Board invoked Harrah's to hold that:
Employee-stockholders also may be excluded from the protections of the
Act where they possess or seek an "effective voice" in management or par-
ticipate directly in corporate policy formulation through membership on an
employer's board of directors.
In circumstances where a group of employees own less than a majority of
an employer's stock and otherwise have no voice in management they are
afforded full representational rights.
Id. at 375 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 376 (stating that Harrah's in-
volved "an attempt to gain control over management through majority control of
stock by a unified group of employees").
232. Id. at 376.
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in the company, but it was still considered an unprotected objective.
It appears, therefore, that an ESOP with a significant amount of stock
will be excluded from section 7 protection, given its mere potential for
"effective control." The level of potential control required to pre-
clude section 7 coverage is unclear, however, especially since the
Board did not base its decision on the percentage of equity that the
ESOP holds. The result is a rule that is far more restrictive of em-
ployee rights than previous Board decisions and a rule that also fails
to provide clear guidelines regarding the level of protection that sec-
tion 7 provides to employee solicitation efforts to obtain employee
ownership plans.
The Harrah's decision illustrates a serious reluctance by the Board
to allow any change in corporate structure under section 7. While
Harrah's declares that it is following past cases, the decision's rejec-
tion of the "solely" entrepreneurial objective standard cuts back on
the coverage previously afforded by Nephi. Harrah's may simply be a
reflection of the Board's traditional view of the employee-employer
relationship.33 Yet, the appropriateness of this policy in today's eco-
nomic environment is doubtful. Although solicitation for employee
ownership may not have been originally intended as a protected activ-
ity, the language of section 7 does not preclude the Board from chang-
ing its interpretation to better accommodate emerging employee
concerns for participation in firm decision-making. The changing
structure of firms, which now seek more employee input and responsi-
bility,234 suggests that activities supporting employee ownership
should be protected. As will be discussed below, employee solicita-
tion for increased control can protect employee rights during imple-
mentation of an employer-initiated ESOP and allow employees to
improve their conditions of employment. Both of these objectives re-
late to "employees' interests qua employees" and suggest that solicita-
tion of employee ownership should be protected. The Board,
however, appears to be moving in the opposite direction, as seen by its
willingness to exclude from section 7 efforts in support of a plan that
involves changes in managerial rights.
If the true test for protection of employee activity under section 7 is
whether the actions attempt to provide "mutual aid or protection" to
employees, then it seems that the Harrah's Board got its reasoning
backwards. The Board implies that if an employee or union proposed
a plan that sought stock for the employees with no control, then it
would be protected under section 7.3 The benefits derived from
233. See Hollo, supra note 40, at 569.
234. See Estreicher, Employee Involvement, supra note 126, at 150 (arguing for a
partial repeal of section 8(a)(2) by limiting the definition of "labor organization" to
those that "bargain with" employers over working conditions).
235. See Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1992) (hold-
ing that "we do not view the envisioned benefits for current employees as bringing the
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such an ESOP, however, would come to employees only in their ca-
pacity as investors. 36 Yet, an ESOP that seeks to implement some
degree of employee control benefits employees not only through
stock, but also through better working conditions and other gains de-
rived from increased worker input.2 37 These incentive and informa-
tional benefits of stock ownership affect "employees qua
employees.""23 If the Board's test is truly "employees' interests as
employees,"2 39 then section 7 should protect plans that are designed
to seek improved conditions for employees through managerial con-
trol. By returning to the "solely" test of Nephi, attempts to implement
employee ownership would be excluded from section 7 protection if
the plans were only intended to address a change in ownership. Plans
that addressed benefits and working conditions, such as the one in
Harrah's, would be protected.
The Board's traditional view of employee interests, as well as its
concern over enabling employers to maintain managerial control free
from union interference, no doubt prevent it from taking the above
approach. Concerns over union interference, however, are protected
by other aspects of the Act24 and should not prevent all employee
attempts to increase their policy-making role in the firm. If the Board
is concerned about other problems that employee control implicates
(e.g., conflicts of interest of a union that represents employee-owners
on the firm's board of directors, union interference with management,
or employer domination of a union), it should discuss those issues di-
rectly and reverse Harrah's. Instead, the Board seems to have opted
for a wholesale preclusion of section 7 protection for activity that
seeks to expand employee ownership as a means of improving both
the financial and working conditions of employees.
B. Are Attempts to Implement Employee Ownership
a Mandatory Bargaining Subject?
If a union wishes to insist, during collective bargaining, that the em-
ployer establish an ESOP, a critical question is whether the plan is a
mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining.24' If a subject is found
proposal within the mutual aid or protection provision of . . .the Act. . . . [T]he
proposal does not advance employees' interests as employees but rather advances
employees' interests as entrepreneurs, owners, and managers").
236. Workers, of course, would be eligible for ESOP benefits only if they were
employees (or ex-employees). The Board, however, clearly does not consider this
factor to be relevant; otherwise, the Harrah's proposal would be protected.
237. For a discussion of benefits, see supra part II.
238. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-68 (1978); see also G & W Elec.
Specialty Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1137 (1965) (finding a section 8(a)(1) violation for
the firing of an employee who criticized operation of company credit union, because
such criticism was related to the interests of employees as employees).
239. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567.
240. See infra Part III.E.2.
241. Title 29, section 158(d) of the United States Code provides in pertinent part:
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to be mandatory, the party that has initial control over the topic must
both bargain with a sincere desire to reach an agreement and bargain
in good faith, and to an impasse, before implementing changes in a
previous agreement.242 Any midterm modifications of a mandatory
subject also must be agreed upon by both parties before a change is
made.243 Moreover, employees who strike over an employer's failure
to bargain over a mandatory subject cannot be discharged.244
The most important implication of the mandatory subject determi-
nation for a union wishing to implement an ESOP is the ruling in
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.24 that the non-con-
trolling party (typically, the union) can use economic pressure, if an
impasse occurs, to insist on the mandatory subject.246 The corollary to
the Borg-Warner rule is that if the subject is declared to be permissive,
the non-controlling party cannot use economic pressure to insist on
the matter.247 Therefore, if a particular subject is declared permissive,
a union has no legally protected means of exerting economic pressure
to force an unwilling employer to even discuss the subject.
A mandatory subject is one that encompasses "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment" under section 8(d) of the
NLRA.24s Congress's intent in implementing a mandatory bargaining
requirement came from "an awareness that refusals to confer and ne-
gotiate had been one of the most prolific causes of industrial strife."24 9
The Supreme Court held that mandatory subjects involve matters
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employ-
ees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ... but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
242. See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road From Borg-Warner to First National
Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 Va. L Rev. 1447, 1478-79
(1982) [hereinafter Harper, Leveling the Road].
243. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (finding an unfair labor practice where
the employer unilaterally changed wage and leave policies); see also Harper, Leveling
the Road, supra note 242, at 1478-79 (discussing the restrictions on mandatory
bargaining).
244. See Harper, Leveling the Road, supra note 242, at 1478-79.
245. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
246. See id. at 349-50; Harper, Leveling the Road, supra note 242, at 1447.
247. See Harper, Leveling the Road, supra note 242, at 1480. For criticisms of the
Borg-Warner rule, see Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., dissenting); William
B. Gould IV, Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment Relationships and the
Law 170-73 (1993); Archibald Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the Octo-
ber Term, 1957, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1084-85 (1958); and Samuel Estreicher, Labor
Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3,39-40
(1993) [hereinafter Estreicher, Labor Law].
248. See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
249. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
about which employees could make concessions." 0 The Court has
also held that collective bargaining is more appropriate for labor in-
vestment issues rather than capital investment concerns. 25 1 Presently,
the primary test for mandatory bargaining subjects focuses on section
8(d) "duty to bargain" subjects ("wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment").252
The Court has struggled to articulate a clear test to determine
whether a subject is mandatory or permissive. In First National Main-
tenance Corp. v. NLRB 213 the Court employed a balancing test,
weighing the employer's need for uninhibited decision-making against
the benefits to labor relations and the collective bargaining process
that would occur through negotiation. 4 This balance seeks to ex-
clude from mandatory bargaining decisions that have a weak impact
on employer-employee relations, particularly those that involve signif-
icant elements of entrepreneurial decision-making. The First National
Maintenance balancing test, however, is quite vague and, given the im-
portance of deciding whether a subject is mandatory, has faced heavy
criticism2 55
Because of the wide variety of employee ownership plans, the de-
termination of a plan's mandatory or permissive nature will also vary.
The central line in such an inquiry is the degree of employee control
that the plan contemplates. If, like many ESOPs, the employer-initi-
ated plan provides little or no employee control, with stock being pro-
vided to offset wage or other benefit reductions, it would seem to be a
mandatory subject. If negotiations over this type of ESOP reach an
impasse, and the subject is determined to be mandatory, the employ-
ees will be able to use economic pressure to prevent the employer
from unilaterally implementing the plan. The ESOP's effect on em-
250. See id. at 214 (declaring subcontracting to be a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing, as employees could potentially offer labor cost concessions).
251. See id. at 213; see also Michael C. Harper, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain
Concerning Business Transformations, in Labor Law and Business Change: Theoreti-
cal and Transactional Perspectives, supra note 86, at 25, 29-30 [hereinafter Harper,
Scope of Duty] (arguing that such a view ignores the economic reality that a decision
on either type of investment affects the other).
252. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
253. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
254. See id. at 679.
[I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decision making, bar-
gaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the
continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit,
for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, out-
weighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.
Id.
255. See, e.g., Harper, Leveling the Road, supra note 242, at 1449 (claiming that the
First National Maintenance decision limited the scope of compulsory bargaining topics
without evidencing a statutory intent to do so); Thomas C. Kohler, Distinctions With-
out Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance, 5 Indus.
Rel. L.J. 402 (1983) (opining that the First National Maintenance decision would have
less impact on collective bargaining than expected).
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ployee benefits in this situation clearly involves "wages" and "condi-
tions of employment" under section 8(d)2 6 and would, therefore,
allow a union to insist, even through economic pressure, on its de-
mands regarding the ESOP's impact on benefits.
A plan that does not involve benefit reductions, but still does not
implicate changes in control, will also be considered mandatory. In
Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 7 the D.C. Circuit enforced a Board
order finding that an employer's refusal to bargain with the union
over a unilaterally-imposed ESOP (entirely funded by the employer)
violated sections 8(a)(1) 251 and 8(a)(5)2 9 of the NLRA.26 The court
concluded that the ESOP,21 which held an insignificant portion of the
employer's publicly traded stock, implicated both "wages" and "con-
ditions of employment. '262 The court then held that wages are a sub-
ject of mandatory bargaining when they involve "direct and
immediate economic benefits flowing from the employment relation-
ship. ' 263 Moreover, the court stated that conditions of employment
involve any benefit received immediately or in the future2l that
"forms a part of the consideration for work performed ... .."2
An important consideration for the court was whether the plan in-
volved benefits that, all other things being equal, would make the job
more attractive than one without the benefit. Because eligibility for
the Richfield ESOP required participants to be an employee for a
minimum number of years, as well as requiring employee contribu-
tions to the plan for those that elected to participate, the benefits re-
sulting from the ESOP were considered "wages" by the Board and the
court. 6 These "wages" would make employment with Richfield
more desirable than employment with a comparable employer with-
256. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
257. 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
258. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (making it an unfair labor practice "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 157").
259. Id. § 158(a)(5) (making it an unfair labor practice "to refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
§ 159(a)").
260. See Richfield, 231 F.2d at 723-24.
261. Richfield announced the ESOP as a voluntary "deferred distribution" plan
under which the company would match an employee's contribution by 50 cents on the
dollar, in addition to an annual contribution to the plan based on profits. See id. at
718-19. The union wanted to increase the number of employees eligible for participa-
tion, to put in place safeguards in case of a strike or lockout, and to make other minor
changes. See id. at 718.
262. See id. at 724.
263. Id (quoting W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949))
(holding a group health and accident insurance program to be a mandatory subject of
bargaining under § 159(a)).
264. The court made an analogy to insurance and pension programs. See id. at 724.
265. Id. (quoting Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247,253 (7th Cir. 1943) (hold-
ing pension and seniority policies to be a mandatory subject of bargaining)).
266. See id. at 724. The Board's opinion also noted that Richfield's ESOP was cov-
ered by I.R.C. §§ 165(a) and 23(p), which stated, in part, that such plans are for the
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
out the ESOP; therefore, the plan was also considered a "condition of
employment. 2 67 In view of these features, the Richfield ESOP, with-
out any employee control over managerial policy, was considered to
be a subject of mandatory bargaining.268
Under Richfield, it is clear that employees can exert economic influ-
ence regarding an ESOP's effect on employee benefits. The ability of
a union or employees to initiate discussion of employee control, unre-
lated to direct employee benefits, is far less certain. While some com-
mentators have suggested that control aspects of ESOPs would be
mandatory if negotiated benefits were offered in exchange,269 this re-
sult is not clear under existing decisional law. Professor Deborah Ol-
son, for example, argues that employees who make concessions in
times of financial turmoil may face a plan that, because of the speed
often needed to finance such deals, is unfair.270 She concludes that, as
shareholders, employee-owners should be allowed to demand voting
rights in stock plans without labor law interference. The Board and
the courts, however, do not appear to be following Olson's suggestion.
The Richfield court explicitly pointed out that the ESOP did not impli-
cate any managerial control, implying that if the plan did involve con-
trol it would not be mandatory. 7'
In cases where economic circumstances force the firm to propose an
ESOP, the extent of voting rights or other types of control should not
be a frequently-raised issue. 72 A union that wants some degree of
control to counter an employer-initiated ESOP's reduction of benefits
does not have to use economic pressure to achieve its goal. The union
merely has to refuse to acquiesce to concessions that are not accompa-
nied by increased employee control over firm decision-making. If em-
ployees are willing to strike for increased control, a simple refusal to
exclusive benefit of employees and are considered compensation for employees' serv-
ices actually rendered. See Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 356, 360 n.7 (1954).
267. See Richfield, 231 F.2d at 724.
268. See id.; see also NKS Distrib., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 338 (1991) (declaring an
ESOP similar to the one in Richfield to be a mandatory subject of bargaining), va-
cated, 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1277 (N.L.R.B. 1995); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of
Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (limiting
mandatory subject to those that "vitally" effect conditions of employement).
269. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 787 (explaining that "where the
employees are forced ... [to agree] to a stock plan in exchange for some previously
negotiated pay or benefits [because of external economic circumstances], all aspects
of the plan, including voting rights, must be mandatory subjects of bargaining").
270. See id. at 787-88.
271. See Richfield, 231 F.2d at 721 (holding that "[t]here is involved no threat to
Richfield's 'maintaining the integrity of its own business ownership' . ... Nor is there
substance to the claim that the situation 'necessarily and inevitably involves bargain-
ing about the conditions and prerogatives of ownership."').
272. The issue could certainly be relevant. The prospect of economic pressure or
refusal to discuss the issues, however, becomes less likely as employees and the union
will be more concerned with the firm's survival than with expanding employees' role
in firm decision-making.
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accept the management's ESOP proposal appears to be far less pain-
ful and avoids potential Borg-Warner problems. The result is a situa-
tion where Board interference is not likely to be requested.
The central question over the Board's role in this area is how em-
ployee-instigated ESOPs, particularly proposals initiated independent
of employer requests for concessions, would be classified. The prob-
able holding is that any aspects of the ESOP that are not directly re-
lated to employee-i.e., non-equity-benefits would be considered
permissive under the NLRA. Union attempts to force discussion, or
use economic pressure, in order to obtain any degree of managerial
control would, therefore, be unprotected. 273 Board rulings state that
matters that "affect the scope, direction, or nature of the business"
would be considered permissive.274 The Board further emphasizes
that unions can represent employees only "in their capacity as em-
ployees" and have no claims as stockholder representatives of the em-
ployees.275 Aspects of the plan that directly affect employee
compensation, such as concessions made for the ESOP or benefits
from the plan, therefore, are considered mandatory. Yet, managerial
decision-making rights under employee ownership would seem to be
permissive, thereby preventing employees or a union, bargaining over
a union-initiated ESOP proposal, from insisting on a significant mana-
gerial role or any other expansion of decision-making power. It is un-
clear, however, whether an employee-instigated ESOP would be
considered permissive in its entirety, or whether only economic pres-
sure for voting rights and other forms of control would be
precluded.27 6
273. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. The suggestion is that if the ESOP
were to implicate the "integrity of its own business ownership" or the "prerogatives of
ownership," it would be considered a permissive subject of bargaining. See Richfield,
231 F.2d at 721.
274. See United Techs., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281, 1281 (N.L.B. 1984) (holding
that decision to transfer and consolidate certain unit work is not a mandatory bargain-
ing subject under section 8(a)(5) and 8(d)), overruled on other grounds by Dubuqne
Packing Co., 303 NLRB 386 (1991); see also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2705 (N.L.R.B. 1981) (imposing no duty to bargain over deci-
sion to close part of its business); Fibreboard Paper Prods., 57 LR.R.M. (BNA) 2609,
2611 (N.L.R.B. 1964) (holding that "'contracting out' of the work previously per-
formed by members of an existing bargaining unit is a subject about which the
[NLRA] requires employers and the representatives . . . to bargain collectively");
Winn-Dixie Texas, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 72, 76 (1978) (holding that a new stock option
plan that did not involve employer contributions, and did not contemplate employee
control, is a mandatory bargaining subject).
275. See Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 356, 363 (1954).
276. Even those commentators who have urged alternatives to the Borg-Warner
approach are often unclear as to their position on the bargainability of ESOP propos-
als. See, e.g., Harper, Scope of Duty, supra note 251, at 29-30 (noting the failure of the
Court to define the scope of mandatory bargaining specifically in relation to em-
ployee ownership). Harper argues that the distinction between mandatory and per-
missive subjects should be determined by the subject's effect on the employer's
product market. See id. He supports the Richfield decision because the ESOP had no
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One problem with the Board's application of Borg-Warner in these
instances is that if employees have a significant amount of stock, with-
out having voting rights or corporate board membership, the company
is able to avoid accountability to a significant, if not a majority, seg-
ment of its stockholders.277 Moreover, as will be discussed below,
managerial rights under an ESOP are still protected from undue labor
influence.278 The NLRA's policy to encourage industrial harmony,
therefore, is not served by allowing management, which may hold its
own self-interest above that of shareholders,279 to avoid economic
pressure from unions trying to implement a control-sharing ESOP
that may boost efficiency, production, and other components of the
firm's performance.28
Employee ownership is not, of course, guaranteed to improve a
firm's performance. Yet, worker attempts to improve their lot as em-
ployees through such plans should not be summarily prohibited
merely because they create an incidental effect on managerial policy-
making or the decision-making structure. Safeguards may be imple-
mented that avoid dangers the Board believes employee ownership
presents (e.g., union conflicts of interest, union interference with man-
agement, and employer domination of unions).28' Moreover, em-
ployee attempts that are aimed solely at managerial change can
remain prohibited,282 while still allowing employees to seek support
for employee ownership plans that implicate some degree of influence
over firm decision-making.
The combination of the Board's policy on both mandatory bargain-
ing and the coverage of section 7283 places extraordinary hurdles on
unions or employees trying to implement an ESOP that increases em-
ployee involvement in management. While solicitation for employee
ownership would be considered concerted activity, Harrah's may pre-
clude its protection under section 7 by declaring such activity an un-
protected objective. In addition, employee ownership plans that
implicate worker control are probably permissive subjects of bargain-
ing, meaning that unions or employees cannot even insist on a discus-
sion of these plans.
influence on the product market. See id. Moreover, he argues that courts should pro-
tect unions' right to exert economic pressure in support of proposals that benefit em-
ployees, including pollution levels in the community. See id. An ESOP that implicates
significant employee control, however, may be treated as permissive under Harper's
analysis, as there is potential for employees to influence the product market.
277. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 788.
278. See id.
279. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
280. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 788.
281. See infra Parts III.E, III.F.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 219-24.
283. See supra Part III.A.
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If a union is supporting employee ownership, its ability to force the
issue is significantly circumscribed by labor law. While the union
could bring up the ESOP in negotiations, under Borg-Warner it is ex-
cluded from exerting any economic pressure to insist on any signifi-
cant employee control. Borg-Warner also weakens the union's
collective bargaining strength as it forces the union to truncate its
opening position regarding employee ownership in order to avoid any
suggestion that it is seeking the amount of control that would render
the ESOP proposal a permissive subject. Moreover, under Harrah's,
an employer can freely discipline union members who solicit em-
ployee-controlled ESOPs, because pressure for a permissive subject is
an unprotected means of seeking section 7 protection.284
The individual employee may not fare much better. Even if the
Board gave the employees more leeway than the union, Harrah's
eliminates any effective means that unorganized workers can use to
garner support for an ESOP that implicates potential control in the
face of a hostile employer. By placing any ESOP that could poten-
tially implement employee control outside of section 7 protection, 29
the Board allows a resistant employer to stifle any employee attempts
to gain support for such a plan.
The inability of employees to obtain leverage against a resistant em-
ployer through economic pressure or on-site solicitation is peculiar.
This stifling of all significant employee control attempts does not ap-
pear to further the NLRA's interests of "industrial peace."' There is
no evidence that employees will abuse employee ownership proposals
to injure the collective bargaining process or the firm. Indeed, an em-
ployee stake in the firm's equity and an increase in shared manage-
ment could achieve the opposite result. Given the beneficial effect
that employee ownership can have on working conditions and em-
ployee-employer relations, excluding these ESOPs from section 7 pro-
tection appears to be unwarranted. Furthermore, in situations where
employee ownership would benefit the company, yet where manage-
ment does not have the proper incentives to implement a change, the
limits on ESOP proposals may lead to decision-making by managers
284. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Changes in sec-
tion 8(d) interpretations, however, would also affect section 7, allowing some means
that were previously unprotected.
285. This may be an overstatement given the Board's later interpretation of Har-
rah's. See Science Applications Int'l Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 373, 376 (1992) (stating that
Harrah's involved "an attempt to gain control over management through majority
control of stock by a unified group of employees"). While this conclusion is borne out
by the facts, Harrah's, itself, presumed that actual control would result from the
ESOP.
286. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937), cited in
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 351 (1958) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that differs from outside investors,287 thereby introducing inefficient
behavior into the firm and into the economy.
The Borg-Warner framework, in particular, is inappropriate for em-
ployee ownership. Aside from the oft-stated criticisms of this frame-
work, 8  its effect on unions, in combination with Harrah's,
unjustifiably hinders employees' attempt to seek control through em-
ployee ownership. Employers opposed to employee ownership can
express their antagonism through no-solicitation rules, refusals to bar-
gain, and even dismissals of employees supporting ESOPs with con-
trol. Employees and unions, however, are unable to insist on
bargaining or use economic pressure for the same plans. There is a
concern that unions will exert undue influence over a firm's en-
trepreneurial decisions,289 yet employee-owned firms are rarely domi-
nated by employees and if so, limits on their influence are clearly
established. Most employee-owned companies, even if majority em-
ployee-owned, only have a minority of employee board members.2 90
Employees will have some influence over entrepreneurial policy, but
the dangers implicated by employee control, especially when labor
policy is removed from employee board members' input,2 91 seem triv-
ial compared with the potential gains of employee ownership, as well
as the harm to employees' bargaining power occuring under the pres-
ent framework.
The combination of the Board's rulings on mandatory subjects of
bargaining and the scope of section 7 reveals an unwillingness to en-
courage or protect employee attempts to initiate ESOPs that could
benefit their firms and the economy. This position fails to advance the
Board's enforcement of the Act, and limits the implementation of po-
tentially beneficial ESOPs. Additionally, those ESOPs that are cre-
ated under the present Board interpretations also may allow
287. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 247.
289. See Harper, Leveling the Road, supra note 242, at 1447.
290. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 33-34) (describing UAL's
board, with only three out of twelve-directors representing employees); Adam Bry-
ant, Pilots Just Want a Little R-E-S-P-E-C-T, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1997, § 4, at 14
(describing growing union frustration with management at United Air Lines
("UAL"), despite its being an employee-owned company).
291. See infra note 364 and accompanying text. These protections will also limit the
ability of unions to exert strategic behavior in order to extract gains through the cor-
porate decision-making process. For instance, UAL has removed its union board rep-
resentatives from labor policy decisions. The twelve member board is made up of five
public directors, four independent directors, two union directors, and one "salaried
and management" director (who represents employees). See Gordon, supra note 88
(manuscript at 33). The employees directly elect three members and have a say in the
election of the six other non-public directors. See id. (manuscript at 34). All labor
issues, such as the collective bargaining agreement, are handled by the "Labor Com-
mittee," which has at least one outside public director, one independent director, and
at least one other director, but cannot have a union director. See id. (manuscript at
35).
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employers to disregard attempts by employees to offset the increased
financial risk of employee ownership through employee participation
in managerial decisions. These interpretations are not necessitated by
the Act; indeed, the policies behind the NLRA would seem to en-
courage a plan that could benefit both the firm and its employees, as
well as the relations between them.
C. Disclosure of Information
In order for employees, or a union, to consider initiating an ESOP,
access to the firm's financial information is essential for them to make
informed decisions about the value of the firm, and hence, the ESOP.
When an employer offers an ESOP, such as where financial trouble
creates a need for cash, the financial information asymmetries will not
pose a problem if the employer has a sincere desire to persuade em-
ployees to make the concessions in return for which the ESOP is be-
ing offered. 2 Yet, if workers seek employee ownership outside of
this concessionary context, particularly in an attempt to gain more
managerial control in the face of hostile management, the employer
has no incentive to provide employees with financial information.
Without this information, employees are unable to evaluate the finan-
cial stability of the firm, thereby precluding any serious consideration
of employee ownership. There is, therefore, a need to understand the
extent to which employees or a union can force the employer to turn
over information regarding an ESOP proposal.
An employer's duty to disclose financial information 293 has been
limited by the courts. In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.,21 the
Supreme Court stated that an employer who claims an inability to pay
wage increases must disclose financial information supporting that
claim.295 Subsequent judicial interpretation of Truitt has limited this
duty to these facts,296 thereby allowing intelligent employers to avoid
disclosure through properly-worded bargaining responses. Under this
scenario, a drive for employee ownership will lack critical information
regarding the firm's profits, costs, sales, and production levels (other
than what is publicly available), 97 making any serious attempt to push
for an ESOP hopeless. The perpetuation of this information asymme-
292. Information may be required in such situations if the negotiations were consid-
ered a mandatory subject of bargaining. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
293. This duty is derived from the duty under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) to bargain in
good faith. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994) (making it an unfair labor practice -to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of § 159(a)").
294. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
295. Id. at 152-53.
296. See Graphic Communications Int'l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168,
1170-71 (7th Cir. 1992).
297. See Robert B. Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective
Bargaining, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. 765, 781 (1985).
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try may not only injure employee ownership prospects, but may limit
labor-management cooperation as well. 298
If an employer, during ESOP discussions, claims a need for com-
pensation reductions due to financial constraints, Truitt will certainly
apply. A claim of an inability to continue the business without conces-
sions implicates the Truitt duty and the employer will have to provide
financial information that enables the union to adequately judge the
merits of the employer's claim for relief and consider the ESOP pro-
posal that the employer is offering in exchange for concessions. An
employer's refusal to provide "requested financial information [that]
is relevant to the subject under negotiation" '99 constitutes a failure to
bargain in good faith under section 8(a)(5).3 ° °
Eberhard Foods, Inc.,3 °l is one of the few NLRB discussions related
to information demands about ESOPs. In Eberhard, the union chal-
lenged an employer's refusal to give financial information that the
union wanted to protect employees' ownership rights under the
ESOP.3 °2 The Eberhard pension plan had been converted into an
ESOP and the union was concerned over its stability given recent
sales of many of the company's stores. The NLRB General Counsel
stated that the employer's refusal to provide information in this case
violated section 8(a)(5), as "an employer must comply with a union's
request for information that will assist the union in fulfilling its re-
sponsibilities as the employees' statutory representative. ' 3 3 The in-
formation must be given "[w]here [it] concerns wage rates, job
descriptions, and other information relating to employees in the bar-
gaining unit. 304
If the Board does not presume the information to be relevant to
bargaining issues, 30 5 the union has the burden of proving relevance.30 6
In Eberhard, the General Counsel assumed that the ESOP was a
mandatory subject of bargaining,30 7 thereby presuming that the infor-
298. See id.; see also Jill Hodges, Reaching for a New Contract; Unions Await Payoff
at High-Flying NWA, Star-Trib., July 29, 1996, at 1D (indicating that labor-manage-
ment cooperation resulting from employee ownership has improved productivity).
299. Elliot Turbomachinery Co., No. 9-CA-30582, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 1236, at *106
(Dec. 18, 1995) (citing Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152).
300. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994).
301. No. GR-7-CA-29140, 1989 NLRB GCM LEXIS 141 (June 30, 1989) (giving an
advisory decision from the NLRB Office of General Counsel).
302. See id. at *5. Twenty-eight items were requested in an "attached copy" that
was not included in the decision.
303. Id. at *6 (citing Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979)).
304. Id.
305. Those issues include wages, job descriptions, and information relating to unit
employees. See New York Times Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1273 (1984).
306. See White Furniture Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 444, 446 (1966), enforced sub norn.
United Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 880, 882-83 (4th Cir. 1967).
307. 1989 NLRB GCM LEXIS 141, at *9 (assuming the ESOP was mandatory be-
cause it replaced the pension plan and was therefore considered a part of the employ-
ees' compensation).
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mation sought was relevant. Given this relevance, the General Coun-
sel held that the union was entitled to information regarding the
financial strength of the ESOP and recommended a complaint be
made against the employer for violating section 8(a)(5) by failing to
provide the union with the information at issue.308 By placing the bur-
den of proving relevance on the union where a subject is permissive,
and placing the burden on the employer where the subject is
mandatory, a balance is struck between the firm's interest in secrecy
and the union's interest in disclosure." 9
What Eberhard does not confront is a case, such as with a majority
employee-owned firm proposal, where the proposed ESOP is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. In particular, if a union sought in-
formation about the company in order to propose significant manage-
rial control for employees, it is unclear if Truitt applies. The union
would have the burden of showing the information's relevance to col-
lective bargaining. Because the Truitt duty is tied to mandatory bar-
gaining subjects,310 seeking information for a controlling ESOP would
probably not be considered part of employer's duty to provide finan-
cial information.
The inability to gather financial information effectively kills a
union's or an employee's ESOP proposal.31 1 There is a need to pro-
tect an employer's sphere of confidentiality, yet whether confidential-
ity concerns are implicated simply because of an ESOP's potential
level of control is questionable. In any event, one solution to these
confidentiality fears is to give the information to a third party, who
would then make recommendations to the union regarding the
ESOP.312
In Bauman v. Bish,31 3 Weirton Steel Company created such an or-
ganization (the "committee") when it was in financial trouble and en-
308. See id. at *16.
309. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-15 (1979).
310. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
Moreover, in a case where the union answers an employer's ESOP proposal with a
demand for information, the analysis will mirror that of the mandatory/permissive
distinction-i.e., the request will be considered relevant if it goes to wages, hours, or
conditions of employment. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text. If the
ESOP involves any benefit changes, the employer will likely have to disclose financial
information regarding the proposal and the firm's financial strength.
311. See, eg., Jim McKay, A Mean Strike: A Union Organizing Drive in Elivood
City Leads to Firings, an Alternative Newspaper and Little Chance of a Settlement Any
Tune Soon, Pitt Post-Gazette, Sept. 1, 1996, at El (describing a case where the em-
ployer demanded an nonrefundable payment of $500,000 to allow the union to look at
the books of an ESOP, thereby killing the union's proposal to take over the plan).
312. See Detroit Edison Co., 440 U.S. at 310, 316-17 (holding that an employer did
not have to give the union copies of aptitude tests taken by employees challenging the
testing procedure because there would be no adequate protection of the tests'
secrecy).
313. 571 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. W. Va. 1983).
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tertaining an ESOP proposal. 1 4 In an effort to obtain data that
consultants of the committee had used in making recommendations to
the company, the union sued under the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959.315 The union was not satisfied with
the consultants' recommendations-in particular, the finding that the
ESOP could succeed with a 32% reduction in labor costs-and
wanted to analyze the data itself.316 The consulting firm hired by the
committee, however, kept the data and computer model of the steel
industry that was used confidential.317 The union argued that they
needed the data to adequately evaluate the proposed 32% cut in com-
pensation, while the employer answered that the cost information in-
cluded in the data needed to be kept secret from competitors and that
the consulting firm had a proprietary interest in keeping the informa-
tion confidential.318 The court denied the union's request, stating that
an expert third party was sufficient to provide financial information to
the union.319 Moreover, the court asserted that the firm's concern
over dissemination of the information by the union was fully ad-
dressed by giving the information to a third party.320
It is possible that a union will not be content in limiting its access to
financial information to third-party intermediaries, as in Bauman, but
the union is still free to reject the employer's proposal. Furthermore,
the third party option may not be useful when the employee owner-
ship plan implicates employee control. The ESOP will not be consid-
ered a mandatory bargaining subject in this instance, and if the union
is unable to show the information's relevance to conventional collec-
tive bargaining subjects, no further disclosure can be had under the
NLRA. It also is possible to allow unions access to the information,
but require secrecy clauses.321 The Board, however, has not been will-
ing to accept secrecy clauses as adequate protection for an employer's
interest.
Access to financial information is critical to the creation of em-
ployee ownership plans. The Board places a great deal of weight on
314. The Weirton Joint Study Committee had twenty-one representatives of the
Independent Steelworkers Union, three representatives of the Independent Guard
Union, and five management representatives. See id. at 1056.
315. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1994) (guaranteeing union members the right to partici-
pate in the deliberations and business of the union's meetings). Despite the com-
plaint's reliance on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, the court
based its decision on the NLRA's duty to bargain. See Bauman, 571 F. Supp. at 1058
(noting that as this was a civil action, the NLRB was not involved in the litigation).
316. See Bauman, 571 F. Supp. at 1056. The data included cost information from
both Weirton and other steel companies, as well as the consultant's own steel industry
model. See id.
317. See id. at 1057.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 1060.
320. See id. (citing Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979); NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1955)).
321. See Estreicher, Labor Law, supra note 247, at 41-42.
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the employer's need to maintain secrecy, often overriding a union's
legitimate needs for the information. Although it is difficult to quan-
tify the actual effects of the Board's holdings, the result may be a sig-
nificant decrease in the number of ESOPs that unions otherwise
would initiate.
D. "Employee" Status
The NLRA's traditional dichotomy between labor and manage-
ment322 poses a significant obstacle to employees gaining managerial
control through employee ownership plans. Because employee-own-
ers possess interests as both employees and owners, there is a question
as to how these workers should be treated under the Act. The Board
has decided a number of cases involving stock ownership plans and an
employee-owner's "employee" status. Generally, continued protec-
tion under the NLRA is inversely related to the extent of control, or
"effective voice," that employee-owners have over corporate
decisions.
In the past, the Board (with some prodding from the Supreme
Court) has excluded managers who "formulate and effectuate man-
agement policies '' 323 from NLRA jurisdiction, often when challenges
are made to a unit determination. If this rule were broadly read, any
employee-owner who participates in an ESOP with majority control
that allows the employee-owner to vote on managerial matters could
be excluded from the NLRA.324 Yet, as long as employee-owners
only retain control through voting rights, there is no fiduciary duty
imposed on the employer or their union. Therefore, conflict of inter-
est concerns over a potential loyalty to ownership are avoided."
These employees are not "managers" as intended under the Act. The
fact that they hold an equity stake in the firm should not bar their
ability to seek collective representation.
If employee-owners possess significant power over managerial pol-
icy-making, a problem could arise for their continued coverage under
the NLRA. Some commentators have suggested that the employer-
employee delineation should be based on whether the employee-
owner has "responsibility to exercise significant discretion in imple-
menting the policies of owners other than themselves."'326 The Board,
however, has ruled that any employee-owners who merely have an
322. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 493-501 (1947) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). The majority holding was later reversed by 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
323. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (quoting Palace Laun-
dry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)).
324. See Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining, supra note 60, at 57.
325. See id at 58.
326. Id.
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"effective voice" in corporate policy will be excluded from the protec-
tions of the NLRA.32 7
The first major Board decision that examined the concern over the
employee-owner distinction was Union Furniture Co.3 28 The firm had
been employee-owned from its inception, but at the time of the elec-
tion only nine non-supervisory employees (out of about ninety) were
shareholders (out of twenty-six). 2 9 The Board decided to remove the
nine employees from a bargaining unit (but did not hold that they
could not receive protection under the NLRA) after the union sought
their exclusion before an election, fearing they would vote against the
union. Four of the employees were members of the company's board
of directors (out of a total of seven), while the other five were rank-
and-fie employees who had a significant voice in the election of
directors.33 °
The Board based the exclusion on two factors, the first being the
employee-owners' voice over management policy. While "the mere
ownership of stock in a corporation does not preclude the inclusion of
the stockholder in a collective bargaining unit[,]"' 331 the Board noted
that, in this case, "matters of labor policy would be referred to the
[stockholders]. '332 The employee-owners also had a strong voice in
the election of the some of the board of directors, thereby giving them
a "substantial interest" in the company.333
In addition to the employee-stockholders' managerial voice, the
Board also raised concerns about the divergence in interests between
employees who owned stock and those who did not.334 Union Furni-
ture thereby set up a two-prong analysis through which the Board ex-
amines the divergence in interests between employees and employee-
327. See, e.g., Sida of Haw., Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971) (holding, in a suit
over the composition of a bargaining unit, that drivers who owned shares of the com-
pany, in addition to owning and maintaining their cabs, were not to be included in a
unit with non-owner drivers because the shareholders received preferential treat-
ment-e.g., rebates on dispatch fees when they are ill-and that 115 out of 142 share-
holders were drivers, thereby precluding arm's length collective bargaining with the
company's officers); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 799 (1952) (exclud-
ing employee-owners because the vast majority of employees were stockholders,
which gave them a strong opportunity to influence management policies, and they
were given preferential treatment over non-owners).
328. 67 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1946).
329. See id. at 1308-09 & n.1.
330. See id. at 1309-10 (noting that two of the stockholder employees used to be on
the board of directors).
331. Id. at 1309.
332. Id. at 1309 & n.4.
333. Id. at 1310.
334. See id. ("The interest of the stockholder employees is generally recognized by
the rank and file workers ... and cannot fail to have considerable impact upon their
behavior.").
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owners, as well as the strength of employee-owners' voice over corpo-
rate policy.
335
Union Furniture's two-pronged analysis has been used, to varying
degrees in later Board holdings. In Brookings Plywood Corp.,3 36 118
non-supervisory employees each held one of 242 shares of the com-
pany.337 While there were many units at issue, the primary one con-
sisted of 117 employees, 113 of which were employee-shareholders.338
The Board stated that "mere ownership of stock.., does not preclude
the inclusion of a stockholder in a collective bargaining unit of the
corporation's employees unless the employee-stockholder's interest is
of such nature as to give him an effective voice in the formulation and
determination of corporate policy. '339 Because the number of em-
ployee-owners was so large, however, the Board found that their con-
trol over corporate policy, in addition to preferential treatment over
non-owner employees (e.g., higher wages and better promotions), pre-
vented them from being protected under the NLRA. 0
Similarly, in Sida of Hawai4' the firm was owned by 142 share-
holders (holding one share each), with 27 owners being ex-drivers and
115 being present drivers.342 The Board excluded the employee-own-
ers from the unit, holding that they could not be considered employ-
ees because of the preferential treatment they received, such as
rebates for sick days, and their control over labor policy.3 3 In partic-
ular, the Board was concerned that the directors would be forced to
335. See also Lakes Pilots Ass'n, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 168, 178 (1995) (excluding
group of employee-owners that owned over half of the company's voting stock); Sida
of Haw., Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971) (holding that drivers who owned shares of
the company must be in different bargaining unit than non-owners); Cab Sers., Inc.,
123 N.L.R.B. 83, 83, 85 (1959) (excluding thirty-eight out of forty-eight employee-
owner cab drivers because, as sole stockholders of the company, they had an effective
voice in setting corporate policy and received preferential treatment over non-stock-
holders); Coastal Plywood & T'imber Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 300, 301-02 (1953) (holding
that employee-stockholders controlling 20% of outstanding stock had no effective
voice in management policy and received no preferential treatment, and were, there-
fore not employees under the Act); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 799
(1952) (excluding employee-owners with strong policy influences from the unit); Mu-
tual Rough Hat Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 440, 444-45 (1949) (including three stockholder-
employees, each of whom held two out of 28 outstanding shares and two of the three
were on the board of directors (which was not involved in management affairs), in
unit because they did not participate in management decisions and did not receive
preferential treatment).
336. 98 N.L.R.B. 794.
337. See id. at 798.
338. See id. at 797.
339. Id. at 798.
340. See id. at 798-99.
341. 191 N.L.R.B. 194 (1971).
342. See id. at 195.
343. See id.
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deal with employees who had the power to oust them, thereby
preventing "arms-length bargaining. 344
Although the Board continues to use Union Furniture's two-factor
analysis, it has weakened the strict dichotomy between labor and man-
agement roles. In S-B Printers, Inc., the Board moved from its ear-
lier holding that the mere possibility of "effective voice" would
preclude inclusion in a unit 346 to requiring an actual exercise of mana-
gerial power, or a "real voice" in corporate policy-making.3 47 Simi-
larly, S-B Printers looked to actual, as opposed to potential,
divergence of interests between employee-owners and non-owners.3 48
The purpose of excluding employees with control over managerial de-
cisions, particularly those involving labor policy, is that "to include
stockholders in the unit would be inappropriate because of the consid-
erable adverse impact on the nonshareholder [employees]. '349 By re-
quiring actual control or divergence of interests, the Board is able to
prevent harm against non-owner employees, while allowing some
shared interests between management and labor.
Despite the implications of S-B Printers, the Board seems more
willing to rely on mere potential control of management to exclude
employee-owners. In Florence Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.,350 the
Board excluded paid firefighters from a unit of volunteer firefighters
because their shareholder status gave them voting rights regarding all
operational policies. The employees in question controlled only two
out of six board representatives, and the representatives did not vote
on wage and employee benefit matters.35' The Board, however, held
that because the employees made up 25% of the workforce, which
ratified all board action, the employees "constitute a large homogene-
ous group clearly having the potential for influencing management
policy ... and are therefore excluded as managerial employees." '352
The exclusion occurred despite the absence of proof of a diversion of
interests or differential treatment between employee-owners and non-
owners.
It is unclear whether Florence is merely an anomaly. While some
later cases have used the two-factor test,353 other analyses seem to
344. See id.
345. 227 N.L.R.B. 1274, 1274-75 (1977) (denying attempt to remove 10 employees
(out of unit of 13) who owned 25% of their firm's stock because there was no evi-
dence that the employees in question possessed actual control over managerial deci-
sions, or were treated differently than non-owner employees).
346. See Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 798-99 (1952).
347. See S-B Printers, 227 N.L.R.B. at 1275.
348. See id.
349. Sida of Haw., Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971).
350. 265 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982).
351. See id. at 956.
352. Id. at 957.
353. See, e.g., Science Applications Int'l Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 373, 374-76 (1992) (al-
lowing election for unit of employee-owners that held only 0.000022% of outstanding
1008 [Vol. 67
LABOR LAW OBSTACLES
focus solely on the amount of actual control that employee-owners
possess. 354 For instance, in EFCO Corp., the AL rejected the em-
ployer's defense, against an section 8(a)(2) 355 charge, that the em-
ployee-benefit committee in question was made up of employee-
stockholders who were not eligible members of a labor organiza-
tion.356 Because the employee-owners in this case held only 25% of
the firm's stock, the ALJ ruled that such employees could be members
of a labor organization, as "[t]here has been no showing [of] ... actual
control, or an effective voice in Company policy... . ,3 No mention
of differential treatment for non-owner employees was made.
Excluding employee-owners from a unit of non-owner employees
whose interests are divergent, particularly when owners receive
favorable treatment, is an appropriate response to the NLRA's re-
quirement of a unit based on "common interests. ' '358 If employee-
owners do have divergent interests from other employees, they should
be separated from the unit, but allowed to seek representation on
their own. Yet, the justification for preventing employees with signifi-
cant managerial control from obtaining any collective representation
is less obvious.359
Even in the absence of divergent interests among employees, the
Board's position against employee control could prevent unions from
obtaining employee ownership plans that allow homogenous voting
among employee-owners (e.g., through a trust). 360 This strategy, how-
shares because they did not receive preferential treatment vis-,a-vis non-owner em-
ployees and had no influence over managerial policy beyond their right to vote for
directors).
354. See, e.g., EFCO Corp., No. 17-CA-16911. 1995 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 185, at *65-
*66 (Mar. 7, 1995) (rejecting employer's defense against domination charge).
355. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994) (making it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it").
356. See EFCO, 1995 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 185, at *66-*67.
357. Id at *66.
358. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
359. See Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining, supra note 60, at 57-61
(describing the intent of the NLRA to create an adversarial system between labor and
management loyal to owners, not between labor and employee-owners with no loy-
alty to other shareholders).
360. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Chi. L Rev. 73, 125 (1988) (arguing
that the reliance on actual power proscribes employee collective representation when
they are able to vote in a significant block); see also, eg., Florence Volunteer Fire
Dept., Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 955, 957 (1982) (finding that paid firefighters were manage-
rial employees who should not be included in a bargaining unit because they -consti-
tute a large homogeneous group clearly having the potential for influencing
management policy"); Sida of Haw., Inc., 191 N.L.RtB. 194, 195 (1971) (excluding
stockholder drivers from a bargaining unit of non-owner drivers because the stock-
holder drivers already have an effective voice in determining policy). While the Flo-
rence decision suggests that this proscription could occur, it is unlikely that the Board
would take this position to its extremes. See supra notes 350-52 and accompanying
text.
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ever, is one of the best ways that employees can gain real power to
affect their concerns as employees. The Board's emphasis on a tradi-
tional model of the workplace may be in play, but does not seem war-
ranted here. Employee-owners who possess actual control over
entrepreneurial policy still have work-related concerns that justify col-
lective representation. Whether voting occurs through a trustee or a
one-person one-vote system, employee-owners' concerns as employ-
ees may not always be satisfied through stock ownership or even man-
agerial control. Board of director representatives are required to
represent the employee-owners' shareholder interests, which may di-
verge from their interests as employees.36'
By relying on control alone as a basis for removing employee-own-
ers from bargaining units, the Board assumes that employee-owners'
participatory rights are strong enough to protect their interests as em-
ployees, as well as owners. This assumption, however, is often false.
Employee-shareholders in virtually all firms will not be able to ad-
dress the number of work-related concerns covered by the NLRA.
Although actual control could allow employee-owners to influence la-
bor policy, the amount of control over this subject is generally lim-
ited.36 Therefore, employees may want, and need, collective
representation based on their employee interests alone.
The Board has recognized that "stockholder-employees not only
have a proprietary interest in the [e]mployer-corporation, but also
have an interest, at least as great, in their status as paid workers." '363
Yet, the Board's desire to maintain the traditional workplace structure
unjustifiably obstructs employees' interests in protecting their section
7 rights when they are excluded from a bargaining unit because of
their ESOP's voice in policy-making. Although employee ownership
of a firm is not a structure that the NLRA was created to address,
typical ESOP firms, even with employee control, are not significantly
different from firms of the past. Most employee-owned firms, even
those in which the employees hold a majority of equity, have a signifi-
cant number of non-employee board members.3 4 Moreover, allowing
union board members some input in the firm's labor policy decisions
should not present too great a threat to either the firm's or employees'
361. See Uchitelle, supra note 8, at 3.
362. See Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 35-36) (discussing the limits placed
on union board members' influence over labor policy, including no input on labor
issues).
363. Everett Plywood & Door Corp., 105 N.L.R.B. 17, 19 (1953); see id. at 18 (al-
lowing election for unit composed of shareholder employees that held 370 out of 480
shares and only one unit member, out of approximately 365, was not a shareholder).
364. For example the Board of UAL has a majority of non-employee members. See,
e.g., Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 33) (discussing UAL's 12 member board,
which contains three union designees and a separate subset of members (the "Labor
Committee") that excludes union designees and deals with labor issues); see also
Hodges, supra note 298 (describing Trans World Airlines' board, which gives the
union three out of 15 seats in exchange for employee concessions).
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interests. While there will be some conflict of interest problems impli-
cated by union influence in a firm's labor policy, as discussed below,
mere influence rather than full control mitigates these conflicts and
allows employee-owners to have both their equity and labor interests
represented. Union board representatives also may be able to reduce
some of the inefficient negotiations and outcomes and that occurs with
a purely adversarial bargaining system.3"5 As long as employee-own-
ers do not have total control over labor policy, the employer-em-
ployee relationship that the NLRA was meant to address still exists
and employee-owners should be allowed to seek collective
representation.
E. Union Representation Problems
If an ESOP involves some degree of control for employees, unions
will often play a key role in exercising the control. 1' Yet, this role
may create problems that result from the union's primary duty to pro-
tect unit employees' rights. The NLRA establishes several require-
ments that are intended to maintain the union's duty to employees
free of any actual or potential conflicts of interest. These labor law
protections, therefore, may pose barriers to union involvement in em-
ployee ownership.
1. Union Directors and Their Duty to Employees
The Board is concerned that a union with managerial interests may
not properly fulfill its role as an employee representative.17 In gen-
eral, this duty will not be violated if the Board determines that the
unions' board representation does not interfere with the employees'
free choice for unconflicted representation. 3" Problems arise, how-
ever, where labor policy is being discussed with union board members'
input. Union participation in these decisions clearly violates the tradi-
tional dichotomy between labor and management 36 9 and recusals by
union board members may be required. 70
365. See supra notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
366. The employee-owners' equity interest will be protected by the ESOP trustee,
who manages the ESOT and has a fiduciary duty to the employee-owners. The
trustee may be a union representative, but her duty is exclusively to the employee-
owner's equity interest. Any firm policy-making power given to the employee-owners
through employee ownership will not be exercised directly through the trustee.
Rather, employee-owners will have input in firm decision-making, typically through
representation on the board of directors. The union will often have the greater role in
this type of representation.
367. See Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining, supra note 60, at 18-29.
368. See Delmonte, supra note 53, at 21.
369. See id. at 20; see also Medical Found. of Bellaire, 193 N.L.R.B. 62, 64-65 (1971)
(holding that a union must not interfere with employees' right to a representative by
placing itself on both sides of the bargaining table).
370. See supra note 362. Union domination of a firm's board, even if it is not in-
volved in creating labor policy, could still present conflict of interest problems. If the
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Under the NLRA, this conflict of interest usually manifests itself
through a section 8(a)(2)3 7 ' charge (often made by a rival union),
viewing the conflict as an issue of employer domination of the
union-i.e., the union and employer becoming the same entity or the
employer having improper influence over the union.372 The NLRB
test looks to the union representatives' level of influence over a corpo-
rate board, the amount of control they have over corporate policy,
and the potential for "infecting" the bargaining process through use of
their control.373 The Board usually requires a union to hold a majority
of board seats before a section 8(a)(2) violation is found, stressing the
need for actual, rather than potential, control. 374 Majority board rep-
resentation by a union, therefore, is necessary to implicate a conflict
of interest, yet it is not clear that such a level of representation is
sufficient to find a violation.3 75 In other, non-board representation
cases, the Board has imposed "a considerable burden on a non-con-
senting employer [who refuses to bargain with the union based on an
alleged conflict of interest] ... to come forward with a showing that
danger of a conflict of interest interfering with the collective bargain-
ing process is clear and present.' '376 A heavy burden of proof, there-
union is found to dominate the company as to be its alter ego, while also representing
the firm's employees, a violation of § 158(a)(2) may be found. See, e.g., Lakes Pilots
Ass'n, 320 N.L.R.B. 168 (1995) (finding a violation of § 158(a)(2) where union officers
were elected during a joint union and company director meeting and the firm's share-
holders had control over internal union affairs); Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B.
135 (1970) (finding a violation of § 158(a)(2) because of the conflict of interest impli-
cated by union officials' dual role as members on the board of directors of the medical
clinics in question, and the union's role as a provider of the majority of the clinic's
demand).
371. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
372. This conflict also may arise in the context of the Board's certification of a
union. See, e.g., Anchorage Community Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976) (holding
that a union can represent employees despite occupying seven out of fifteen board
seats).
373. See John Lund, Union Owned or Sponsored Building Trades Cooperatives: A
Review of Labor Law Issues, 41 Lab. L.J. 685, 690 (1990); see also St. Louis Labor
Health Inst., 230 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 & n.9 (1977) (finding a conflict of interest where
the president of the union represented the employer, a non-profit medical equipment
supplier, in collective-bargaining negotiations with his own union).
374. See Lakes Pilots Ass'n, 320 N.L.R.B. at 177-78; Anchorage Community Hosp.,
225 N.L.R.B. at 579; see also St. Louis, 230 N.L.R.B. at 182 (finding a section 8(a)(2)
violation because of the conflict of interest implicated by union officials' dual role as
members on the board of directors of the medical clinic in question, and the union's
role as a provider of the majority of the clinic's demand); Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181
N.L.R.B. 135, 139 (1970) (same). UAL, for instance, has avoided this concern by
having only three employee representatives out of twelve board members, and none
of the employee representatives deal with labor policy. See supra note 291.
375. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 791-92.
376. NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968); see also H.P
Hood & Sons, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 194 (1970) (holding that an employer was required
to bargain with the union, because a loan made by the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters to the employer's competitor was not a conflict of interest given a lack of
proof of intervention by the Teamsters in the local union's bargaining).
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fore, is required to overcome the Board's policy of favoring
employees' free choice of a bargaining representative. In Richfield
Oil Corp., the Board allowed the union to bargain for employees that
held only a minority of the company's stock and had no managerial
control.3 7 7 This ruling has not been extended to ESOPs that control a
majority of a company's stock and give the union board representa-
tion. The Board clearly stated that union representatives can only
represent employee-stockholders in their interests as employees and
not over "stockholder meetings, corporate elections, or any other mat-
ter in which only stockholders have the right to be heard."378 Using
Richfield, the Board would apparently allow employee-owners to be
represented by a union under an ESOP with a minority holding of
shares. What is less clear are the ramifications of an ESOP with ma-
jority control by the union. Richfield seems to suggest that no con-
fficts of interest exist if union representatives only bargain with regard
to "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment."379 Yet, any attempt to discuss managerial policy may
not only be a permissive subject of bargaining,3so but may result in a
conflict of interest between the union's duty to employee-owners and
non-owners.
The union can also violate its duty to employees by possessing inter-
ests in companies that compete with its members' employer. If a
union gains majority control of an employer's board of directors, the
unions' representational activity in other firms may be limited because
such control, "even where the directors are nothing more than mem-
bers of their unions and not serving in the capacity of union officers or
employees, appears to normally disqualify the union from represent-
ing competitors of that employer. '38 1 In cases such as Bausch and
Lomb Optical Co.,382 where the union operated a direct competitor of
the employer, the Board will clearly disqualify union representa-
tion.383 This test is concerned with the traditional arms-length bar-
gaining relationship and seeks to avoid entanglement between the
union and the employer. 3s Yet, the Bausch and Lomb analysis does
not apply when employees merely own company stock.' In these
377. 110 N.L.R.B. 356 (1954), affd sub. nor1. NLRB v. Richfield Oil Corp., 231
F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.); see also James 0. Castagnera & Michael R. Ostro%ski, Players
Without Picket Signs: A Plan for Employee Ownership in Professional Athletics, 42
Wayne L. Rev. 73, 98 (1995) (stating that the NLRB "did consider and reject the
contention that a union cannot represent and bargain for employees of an employee-
controlled company" (emphasis omitted)).
378. Richfield, 110 N.L.R.B. at 363.
379. Id.
380. See supra Part III.B.
381. Lund, supra note 373, at 689.
382. 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
383. See Lund, supra note 373, at 691.
384. See id at 692.
385. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 790.
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situations, the conflict of interest concern is eliminated because com-
petition between employee-owners and management is lacking.386 A
union that seeks significant control in a firm, however, must be careful
to look at its other representational interests. If the union does obtain
control of a firm, there is a risk that it will be precluded from repre-
senting employees of that firm's competitors.
A union contemplating an employee ownership plan needs to re-
spect its duty to employees. Unions must be sensitive to conflict of
interest problems when negotiations over the board's structure occur,
particularly discussions involving the union's role on the board.387
While a typical employee buy-out plan involving concessions will re-
sult in one-third of the board of directors representing salaried em-
ployees, one-third representing the bargaining unit, and one-third
being independent, 388 a union majority on the board could pose seri-
ous labor law problems. Unions have attempted to minimize conflicts
of interests by allowing employees to elect union designees as board
members who do not have official roles with the union.389 Yet, the
extent to which such a voting scheme is a safeguard against violations
is unclear; therefore, a union with a majority of board seats cannot be
certain it will avoid a finding of a conflict of interest.
The Board has a legitimate interest in protecting the union's duty to
its employees. Holding that a union majority on the board of direc-
tors constitutes a conflict of interest, therefore, is appropriate. Where
the union has total control of the firm, it has essentially become the
firm. Under this scenario, the union faces a conflict between its duty
to represent the employees and its duty to all shareholders having the
ultimate control in running the company. A bright-line rule that pro-
hibits a union majority on the board allows union board representa-
tion to occur under an employee ownership plan without confusion
regarding conflict of interest problems. Unions that intend to con-
tinue representing unit employees merely need to limit their board
representation to less than a majority. Employee ownership plans can
create significant employee control, while only providing employee-
386. See id. In fact, because of the lower diversification involved with ESOPs, em-
ployee-owners have an even greater incentive to see that the firm is performing at its
best.
387. See Gordon, supra note 88 (mansucript at 33) (discussing UAL's insulation of
employee board members from firm labor policy); see also Helen S. Scott, Union Di-
rectors and Fiduciary Duties Under State Corporate Law, in Labor Law and Business
Change: Theoretical and Transactional Perspectives, supra note 86, at 115, 124-25
(discussing conflicts of interest implicated by union board representatives' duties to
shareholders and workers).
388. See Wilkus, supra note 18, at 35 (discussing typical board structure following
employee buy-out plans).
389. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 793-94 (discussing why em-
ployee-stockholders board representation may lessen conflicts of interest).
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owners with a minority of board seats."' These plans should act as a
model for unions who seek increased control for employee-owners,
but want to avoid conflict of interest problems. Alternatively, em-
ployee-owners could achieve a majority of board seats by electing
some non-union representatives.391 The key is to avoid having a
union in a situation where it must represent the labor policy interests
of both the firm and the workers.
2. Union Interference With Management
Union board representation also raises concern over possible union
interference with an employer's selection of a bargaining representa-
tive, which is prohibited under the NLRA. 39 - This problem can arise
when union board members are involved in a fight over the choice of
an employer's bargaining representative, thereby implicating section
8(b)(1)(B) 93
There has been little Board action on union interference resulting
from employee ownership. The most relevant case is NLRB v. Amax
Coal Co.394 In Amax, the union struck in an attempt to induce the
employer to join a national trust for employee pension and welfare
benefits.3 95 The employer alleged that the union was interfering with
the trustee, and that interference was a violation of section 8(b)(1)(B)
because the trustee was a collective bargaining representative.396 The
Court held that the trustee merely ran a benefit plan and was not en-
gaged in collective bargaining.397 The union was found not to have
violated section 8(b)(1)(B) because there was no interference with the
adversarial collective bargaining process.3 98
It is unclear, however, whether any attempt by union board mem-
bers to influence the choice of a bargaining representative would run
afoul of section 8(b)(1)(B). Some have argued that board members
are entitled to affect management direction, and that union board
members should be free to do so under the NLRA.3' Yet, union in-
390. See Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 33-35) (discussing UAL's employee
ownership plan and resulting board structure).
391. For example, a non-union employee representative sits on UAL's Board. See
supra note 291. This non-union board member is elected by the employees, but has
no connection to the union, thereby avoiding any potential conflicts of interest that
the union's board representation may implicate.
392. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1994) (making it an unfair labor practice for a
union to "restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining").
393. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7. at 795.
394. 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
395. See id. at 326.
396. See id- at 327.
397. See id at 337-38.
398. See id. at 335-36; see also Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 795 (anal-
ogizing holding that trustee did not serve in the adversarial role of a collective bar-
gaining representative).
399. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 795-96.
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fluence over a firm's choice of a bargaining representative seems to
violate the Board's attempt to maintain adversarial collective bargain-
ing relations, free from conflicts of interest. While a union that has a
majority of seats on a board would clearly have problems regarding
their duty to employees,400 union representatives merely voting on an
employer's collective bargaining would probably result in a section
8(b)(1)(B) violation. The Board has not ruled directly on this ques-
tion, however. Union members' direct involvement in an employer's
choice of bargaining representative seems to go against the Act's con-
cerns in this area. Under Amax, the Board would likely proscribe a
union's direct vote on management's choice of collective bargaining
representatives. 40 1 This exclusion would not significantly limit the
union board members' role as an employee-owner representative, but
would maintain the integrity of the collective bargaining process.
F. Employer Domination of a Union
One of the original purposes of the NLRA was to protect employ-
ees against sham "company unions" that employers created to avoid
recognizing employees' choice of collective representation. 402 The
policy behind section 8(a)(2)403 was to allow employees to choose,
free from employer influence, an independent representative to pro-
tect their interests.4 4 The legislative history of the NLRA reveals the
concern over employer-dominated unions that subjugate employees'
ability to engage freely in collective bargaining.40 5 Initial Board deci-
sions, therefore, avoided any potential conflict of interest, no matter
how small.40 6 Yet, with the increasing demand for employee input
into firm decision-making,40 7 the justification for this strong position
has been questioned.40 8
In the employee ownership context, the Board usually bases a sec-
tion 8(a)(2) violation on the extent to which the employer, through
the union ESOP trustees, has influence over the union, and whether
400. See supra Part III.E.1.
401. See Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 33-35).
402. See Estreicher, Employee Involvement, supra note 126, at 125, 129-33.
403. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994) (making it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it").
404. See Estreicher, Employee Involvement, supra note 126, at 129-33; see also
Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining, supra note 60, at 7 (discussing purpose of
independent employee representative).
405. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 999-1001 (1992); Estreicher, Em-
ployee Involvement, supra note 126, at 129-33.
406. See Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining, supra note 60, at 9 (citing
Kunst, 100 N.L.R.B. 146, 150 (1952)); see also Shell Oil Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 835, 847
(1937) (noting that allowing union use of the telephone was evidence of an illegal
company interference).
407. See Estreicher, Employee Involvement, supra note 126, at 126-27.
408. See supra note 126 (discussing the TEAM Act).
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this influence diminishes the union's ability to represent employees
fairly.-"9 Typically, this analysis mirrors that of a union's fiduciary
duty to its members.410 The Board looks for a conflict of interest be-
tween the union's representation on the firm's board and their duty as
the employees' collective bargaining representative. Where union
members make up the majority of a board of directors, the Board typ-
ically finds a section 8(a)(2) violation resulting from a conflict of inter-
est.411 The Board has held that where a union has a dual role as both
the employees' exclusive representative and as the majority represen-
tative on the board of directors, the union (considered the employer
at this point) is unable to adequately represent the employees and a
section 8(a)(2) violation occurs. 412 This "proximate danger of infec-
tion of the bargaining process '413 is deemed to be too great to satisfy
the NLRA's requirement that the employees' representative be fully
aligned with their interests.
As with a union's duty to employees, the concern over employer
domination of a union is serious, but avoidable. The union and em-
ployer can readily construct safeguards that prevent the union from
having a dual role as both the employer and employee representative.
A carefully constructed plan, such as the one at United Air Lines
(where union representatives are not involved in labor policy), can
both preserve a union's board representation and its role in collective
bargaining, while avoiding a conflict with the union's duty to
employees.414
G. Exclusion of Union Members from an ESOP
A firm risks violating section 8(a)(5) 415 if it creates an ESOP that
includes unit employees without first bargaining with the union. Con-
versely, establishing a benefits plan through an ESOP that excludes
409. See Olson, Worker Ownership, supra note 7, at 792; see also David Buttrick
Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 438 (1967) (holding that an employer was required to bargain with
the union, because a loan made by the International union to the employer's competi-
tor was not a conflict of interest given a lack of proof of intervention by the Interna-
tional in the local union's bargaining), modified sub. non. NLRB v. David Buttrick
Co., 399 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1968).
410. See supra Part III.E.1.
411. See Lakes Pilots Ass'n, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 168, 179-80 (1995) (finding a section
8(a)(2) violation where union officers were elected during a joint union and company
director meeting); St. Louis Labor Health Inst., 230 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1977) (finding
a conflict of interest where the president of the union represented the employer, a
non-profit medical equipment supplier, in collective-bargaining negotiations with his
own union).
412. See supra Part III.E.l.
413. Centerville Clinics, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 135, 140 (1970) (quoting NLRB v.
David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 508 (1st Cir. 1968)).
414. See Gordon, supra note 88 (manuscript at 33-37).
415. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994) (making it an unfair labor practice "to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provi-
sions of § 159(a)").
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union members risks violating section 8(a)(1)4 16 by discriminating
against employees who choose to be represented by a labor organiza-
tion. This problem seems to have some significance as, of the approxi-
mately 53% of employees who do not participate in ESOPs at their
firm, almost 20% are excluded because of their union membership, or
because they were foreign workers.417 The tension between these un-
fair labor practices has been reasonably met by the Board, which has
protected a union's right to bargain over ESOPs, while preventing the
exclusion of union members from employee ownership plans.
The Board has found an unfair labor practice when a company's
ESOP totally excludes union members-i.e., when the employer flatly
refuses even to bargain over such employees' inclusion. 418 When an
employer precludes union members from ever participating in an
ESOP, the Board has held that the plan violates employees' section 7
right to choose collective representation.419 Yet, if the ESOP is con-
sidered a mandatory bargaining subject, an employer cannot unilater-
ally implement the plan if it includes union members.420 The solution
to this problem for many companies has been to include a provision in
its ESOP eligibility requirements that excludes union members unless
the collective bargaining agreement explicitly allows participation.42 '
The Board has stated that these provisions do "not cut off the benefits
prior to negotiations, but contemplate[ ] the continuation of the bene-
fits during the negotiations. 422
The Board's response to this potential problem is warranted. The
balance between the union's right to bargain over mandatory subjects
and the employees' right to participate in employee ownership plans is
satisfied. While this approach may delay unit employees' participa-
tion in employee ownership, there should be little difficulty in ob-
416. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
§ 157").
417. See Blasi & Kruse, supra note 12, at 499 (citing statistics, compiled by Douglas
Kruse, of 1984 reports to the IRS by employee-owned firms with over 100
employees).
418. See Raven Indus., Inc., Nos. 9-CA-2799, 9-RD-1575, 1991 NLRB LEXIS 973,
at *20 (Aug. 7, 1991) (finding a section 8(a)(1) violation where union members were
excluded from participation in a profit sharing plan); Belcher Towing Co., 265
N.L.R.B. 1258, 1267-69 (1982) (finding section 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) violations where
employer exempted employees covered by collective bargaining agreement from the
ESOP); Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 375, 379
(1970) (finding an unfair labor practice when an employer requires a union to waive
bargaining rights over the ESOP for members to be eligible).
419. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 257-68 and accompanying text.
421. See Handelman Co., 283 N.L.R.B. 451, 452 (1987) (holding that the following
plan did not violate section 8(a)(1): "(1) 'Covered Employee' means any Employee
who is classified by the Company as full-time and who: ... (ii) Is not covered by a
collective bargaining agreement entered into by the Company unless such agreement,
by specific reference to the Plan, provides for coverage under the Plan.").
422. Id. at 452.
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taining an agreement between the employer and the union. Because
the employer is initiating the ESOP, it would seem to have little incen-
tive to exclude union members, unless the employer is motivated by
anti-union animus. The one potential sticking point would be a union
demand for additional benefits. If, for example, the union demands
that the ESOP provide additional benefits or control, an employer's
legal refusal could result in a plan in which only non-unit employees
participate. It is unlikely, however, that this result will occur. A union
has little reason to exclude its members from an ESOP merely be-
cause the benefits (not requiring employee concessions) provided are
not as large as the union would like. Moreover, if the plan involves
concessions that the union is unwilling to accept, the Board protects a
union's decision to participate in the plan, as well as the freedom to
exert economic pressure against the employer.4"
A union's ability to insist on a permissive aspect of an ESOP, such
as employee control, remains a problem. This issue, however, is a
function of the Board's mandatory/permissive regime,424 and is not
affected by employee ownership participation rules. Accordingly, the
Board has adequately met employer, employee, and union concerns
regarding the exclusion of unit employees. These issues, therefore,
will not be problematic for a properly created employer-initiated
ESOP.
IV. THE EFFECT OF LABOR LAW OBSTACLES ON
ESOP FORMATION
The Board's application of labor law to employee ownership plans
creates significant obstacles to the implementation of employee mana-
gerial rights. While the Board's respect for the traditional employee-
owner dichotomy may have been justified in the past, present eco-
nomic conditions make the continued wisdom of this policy doubtful.
One must ask whether Board interference with employee ownership,
particularly with plans that contemplate employee control, is war-
ranted in today's economic environment. Given increased employer
interest for employee involvement in managerial policy,4" employees
must be able to protect themselves from the threat of employer domi-
nance. Employee ownership provides a compromise between the par-
ties, giving employers more access to employees' informational
advantage, while protecting employee interests in the workplace.
The different aspects of labor law appear to be linked in the applica-
tion to employee ownership, focusing heavily on employee-owners'
ability, or potential ability, to exert control over firm policy. While
violations of a union's duty to employees require a majority presence
423. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
424. See supra Part III.B.
425. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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of union members on the corporate board,4 26 other problems are
based on the employee-owners' "actual control" or "effective voice"
in managerial policy.427 The actual control or effective voice require-
ment creates severe hurdles. A resistant employer can easily stymie a
union or employee that seeks to increase employee control through an
ESOP. If the ESOP is found to provide "effective voice" or control,
the employee's solicitation and insistence on plans contemplating such
control will not receive section 7 protection.428 An employer, there-
fore, can bar solicitations for these plans by proscribing any attempt
by an employee to seek on-site support, and can legally terminate an
employee who violates the ban. Any attempts to obtain financial in-
formation can also be rebuffed by an employer if the plan seeks signif-
icant employee control. Finally, and most importantly, a union is
unable to insist upon, or use economic pressure to secure, a proposal
that implicates employee control over managerial policy-making.
In addition to these obstacles, the Board's labor law interpretations
also create uncertainty for proponents of employee ownership. Be-
cause the Board's application of its test for "employee control" occurs
post hoc, and typically without advisory judgments, a union may be
unsure whether their activity on behalf of an ESOP is protected. The
Board's application of unions' duty to employees, which centers on
whether the union controls a majority of the board representatives, at
least provides a clear rule that unions can satisfy by creating an em-
ployee ownership proposal. The "effective voice" distinction provides
no such guidance. If, for example, an employer proposes an ESOP
that the union will accept only if employees are given a greater voice
in managerial policy, the union faces uncertainty as to the legality of
its continued insistence. If the employer opposes increased employee
control, the union lacks a clear picture of what legal means it can use
to encourage movement by the employer. An employer can also pre-
vent an employee attempt to solicit support if the Board later deter-
mines that the employee proposal seeks too much control.4"'
Employees may even be legally fired if they miscalculate the level of
control sought.43°
The Board's position against employee control also significantly
limits a union's bargaining ability. Bargaining often requires move-
ment from both sides, yet the Board's employee ownership jurispru-
dence places a ceiling on the union's proposals, thereby limiting their
ability to bargain effectively. An employer can frame the negotiations
by proposing no employee control, while the union must truncate its
first offer to fall below the level of control that would allow an em-
426. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
427. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
428. See supra Part III.A.
429. See Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1992).
430. See id. at 185.
1020 [Vol. 67
LABOR LAW OBSTACLES
ployer to preclude discussion. Of course, an employer that is serious
about implementing an ESOP can bargain with the union at or above
the "effective control" level. The scope of the negotiations, however,
is effectively determined by the employer. The result of the Board's
application of the NLRA to employee ownership places an immense
bar on the implementation of employee input into managerial policy.
The union's primary role is to represent employees in collective bar-
gaining. There does not appear, therefore, to be justification for fet-
tering a union's ability to bargain with employers over employee
control.
The Board's determination of section 7 coverage in HarrahI's4 31 is
also particularly troubling. Presumably, employees are now unable to
advance any proposals for significant input into managerial decision-
making without fearing employer retaliation. If the employer pro-
poses an ESOP and an employee encourages other workers to seek
control through the plan, that employee could be fired. Even in a
financially troubled company, management's unwillingness to discuss
employee ownership could legally preclude employee attempts to save
the company by exchanging wage concessions for equity and some
level of control.
The Board's protection of employer resistence to proposals for em-
ployee control in situations where they also proscribe union or indi-
vidual employee insistence on employee control seems hypocritical.
Employee efforts to gain control are clearly concerted 432 and the only
justification for leaving such action unprotected is the Board's reliance
on the traditional separation between employees and owners. Yet, by
barring protection for an entire employee ownership proposal due to
the mere potential for employee control, the Board eliminates any re-
alistic chance for employees to initiate ESOPs that provide the most
benefit to workers. The threat that the Board perceives in such con-
trol is not obvious. The rules against union domination and conflicts
of interest remove the serious problems associated with employee
control.433 What, then, is the danger in employees possessing an "ef-
fective voice" in managerial policy? Some managers may be
threatened, particularly if employee ownership is a superior organiza-
tional structure.4" This protection for managerial interests, however,
seems to lack adequate justification for precluding section 7 coverage
for a plan that may benefit not only employees, but the entire firm.
One of the most serious problems for employee ownership results
from the Borg-Warner rule, which prohibits economic pressure for
permissive bargaining subjects.435 While an argument can be made
431. See id at 182.
432. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
433. See supra Part III.E.
434. See supra note 186.
435. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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that employee control should be considered a "condition of employ-
ment" and, therefore, a mandatory bargaining subject,436 the Board
would probably designate plans seeking such control as permissive.
The problem that arises is that "permissive" subject treatment means
that unions are not able to employ economic pressure to insist on in-
creased employee control.437 Because unions are best suited to han-
dle initiation and control of these plans,438 limits on their power of
insistence are serious. As stated above, a union's ability to initiate
ESOP discussions implicating employee control could be eliminated
in the face of a hostile employer. Borg-Warner adds an even more
troubling aspect by rendering the union unable to bargain over em-
ployee control terms in an employer-initiated ESOP.
Employer attempts to use employee ownership as a capital raising
tool can be quite useful for a firm, yet it can also leave employees with
increased risk.4 39 Ideally, a union should be able to counter employer
ESOP requests with demands for the level of employee control that
would compensate for these risks.440 Yet, Borg-Warner precludes a
union from insisting on any significant employee control. The result
of this preclusion is either an ESOP that leaves employees with more
risk, or a bargaining breakdown that eliminates a plan with potential
benefits for the entire firm. Theoretically, management would allow
increased employee control if it provided an overall benefit for the
company, but possible misaligned interests, such as management self-
protection, 441 can hinder such agreements. A union, therefore, is un-
able to insist on an ESOP that could potentially benefit both employ-
ees and the company as a whole merely because management, whose
objections could be very weak, opposes the proposal.
Alternatives to the Borg-Warner approach would, at a minimum,
allow unions with strong preferences about employee control to insist
on these measures. Justice Harlan's Borg-Warner dissent would sepa-
rate the duty to bargain from the right to insist.442 The result of his
approach would allow unions that felt strongly about employee con-
trol to use economic pressure to effectively communicate their prefer-
ences to employers who exercise their right not to bargain about
employee control. Borg-Warner remains the law, however, even
though its regulation of preferences in this area makes little sense.
436. See Olson, Real Voice, supra note 65, at 116-17.
437. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
439. See supra Part II.B.1.
440. Clearly, discussion of benefit concessions will be mandatory. Demands for
employee control, however, particularly where no concessions are sought and de-
creased diversification would result, remain permissive.
441. See supra note 186.
442. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 352 (1958)
(Harlan, J., dissenting in part); Estreicher, Labor Law, supra note 247, at 39-40 &
n.133.
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Labor law, therefore, only furthers the reluctance that unions already
have towards employee ownership, even where a plan could benefit
both employees and the firm. Proscriptions against union or em-
ployee attempts to initiate an ESOP that it believes would help a firm
or its employees do little to further the policies of the NLRA. On the
contrary, allowing unions, or employees, to demonstrate their prefer-
ences for employee ownership through the normal use of economic
pressure would both increase protection for employee interests, while
possibly eliminating managerial resistance to a change that could ulti-
mately benefit the firm. This change is within the Board's interpreta-
tive and implementation power under the Act and would foster
economic growth through the implementation of beneficial ESOPs in
situations where they were previously barred.
The final issue regarding labor law obstacles to the implementation
of employee ownership is the changing structure of the American
workplace. The need for increased worker participation and input in
the production process has been heralded by business for years." 3
Unions, however, are concerned about their workplace role diminish-
ing as a result of employee participation occurring outside of the col-
lective bargaining process.' If the labor law obstacles discussed here
were relaxed, employee ownership could provide a means through
which all parties could benefit.
CONCLUSION
The implementation of ESOPs with significant employee control
could allow unions to retain an important role in the workplace.445
Unions are uniquely suited to defend and represent employee inter-
ests in the negotiation, implementation, and maintenance of employee
ownership plans because of their organizational and informational ad-
vantages." 6 Additionally, employees would benefit through increased
participation and equity in the firm.' 7 And, if employers are serious
about employee participation, ESOPs that increase employee control
should be an acceptable means of gaining employee input. Employee
ownership, therefore, could provide a compromise between employers
who want increased employee input into the production process, un-
ions who want to protect their role in the workplace, and employees
who seek to protect their interests by obtaining managerial control.
443. Consider business' heavy support for the TEAM Act, which would weaken
§ 8(a)(2)'s prohibition on worker committees. See, eg., 142 Cong. Rec. S7469-70
(daily ed. July 9, 1996) (statment of Sen. Kassebaum) (discussing the favorable busi-
ness decisions that the TEAM Act encouraged and discussing the need for increased
worker input in business decisions).
444. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
447. Reduced diversification, however, must remain a concern.
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In certain situations, ESOPs providing employee control can benefit
firms. While unions are better suited to initiate and manage employee
ownership plans, they have been reluctant to become involved in
these plans. Although some of this reluctance results from organized
labor's own attachment to tradition, labor law obstacles, at a mini-
mum, create severe disincentives for unions to change their ways. The
result is that a potentially better organizational structure can be
barred by employers or managers who use labor law as a shield
against employee-initiated ESOPs that threaten their power. Further-
more, precluding employee attempts to gain managerial control leaves
employees more vulnerable to financial risk and employer influence,
and thereby less willing to provide information valuable to the firm.
Employee ownership, by increasing employee participation in mana-
gerial decisions, could improve their firm's performance, while also
protecting employee interests and maintaining unions' role in labor
relations. This potential, when considered with the negative impact
that labor law has on the implementation of employee ownership
plans, may provide critics like Hansmann with an explanation for the
relative dearth of such plans.
Labor law is not the only obstacle to employee ownership, yet it is a
serious problem that is often avoidable. The Board should consider
relinquishing its reliance on the past and allow employees and unions
to seek support for, or insist on, plans that could benefit all the parties
involved. Without such a change, the Board risks an unwarranted sid-
ing with employers and management, who may forego the firm's bene-
fit for their own by eliminating employee pressure for increased
employee ownership and control. The economic environment contin-
ues to change, and employee ownership is a vital part of this dynamic
climate. Rather than create obstacles to a business structure that
counters its traditional workplace model, the Board should recognize
these changes and facilitate implementation of employee ownership
plans.
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